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I. INTRODUCTION
The first major battle of the wine war is now history. The rebels un-
expectedly routed the States' forces and their powerful wholesaler allies
and won a convincing victory in Granholm v. Heald.' Trade barriers block-
ing e-commerce in wine that once seemed invincible have been tom down,
or at least damaged.
The assault on wine trade barriers began in 1998 in Indiana, of all
places. Two lawyers from the Hoosier state and a handful of wine consum-
ers declared war on laws that prohibited ordering wine over the Internet and
denied them access to hundreds of small producers. Somewhat unexpect-
edly, the plaintiffs won the initial battle.' News of the victory spread
through the wine world, and new recruits began arriving. Cases were filed
in Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia and New York. The
wine industry, which had at first been reluctant to get involved, joined the
fray.
The intoxicating feeling of victory was quickly replaced by the hang-
over of three defeats in a row. The plaintiffs lost in Florida3 and Michigan,4
and suffered a devastating defeat as the Seventh Circuit reversed and va-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, and Counsel of Record for the plaintiffs in
Granholm v. Heald. My co-counsel in Granholm was Robert D. Epstein, who helped develop every one
of these issues over nearly eight years of litigation. I also owe debts of gratitude to Clint Bolick, Ken
Starr, Jim Seff, Kathleen Sullivan, and Tracy Genesen, all of whom participated with us in crafting the
Supreme Court argument, and to the army of legal scholars and lawyers who wrote a total of 26 briefs in
the case-including Paul Bender, Susan Estrich, Stuart Banner, Steven Diamond, Drew Days, Miquel
Estrada, Carter Phillips, Viet Dinh, and the firms of Dickstein Shapiro, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Mor-
rison & Foerster, Jenner & Block, Sidley & Austin, Patton Boggs, Pillsbury Winthrop, King & Spal-
ding, and Kirkland & Ellis. As counsel of record, I read every one of those briefs. It is inevitable that
some of the ideas, citations, and phrases used in this Article should properly be attributed to them but
are not because I have misplaced the mental citation. Finally, special thanks to Dean Lauren Robel who
supported my work on the Granholm case and defended me when I was attacked personally by the wine
wholesalers.
I Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
2 Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
3 Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
4 Heald v. Engler, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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cated the plaintiffs' initial victory in Indiana.5 The trade barriers held.
Momentum shifted to the states. Wine industry support faltered, and rebel
supplies ran low-one more defeat, and the revolution would be over.
That one additional defeat never happened. The rebels won the next
eight decisions-in the district courts of Virginia,6 North Carolina,7 Texas,8
and New York,9 and in the courts of appeals for the Fourth,"0 Fifth,"' Sixth, 2
and Eleventh 3 Circuits. State officials in Texas and North Carolina surren-
dered, but others fought on. Then, the Second Circuit surprisingly upheld
New York's law to set up a split in the Circuits, 4 and the battleground
shifted to the Supreme Court. Fighting in the Supreme Court is unlike any
other kind of litigation. It is covered on the front pages of the New York
Times and Wall Street Journal. It is fought behind the scenes at the highest
levels of government. Alliances must be formed because you need all the
friends you can get to support you with amicus briefs. 5 It is politics writ
large. Luckily for the rebels, former Solicitor-General Kenneth Starr ar-
rived in the nick of time, bringing with him his small band of Washington
troops who were experienced in this kind of in-fighting. 6 The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) also supplied much-needed ammunition in the
form of a strong, and judicially noticeable, report on the anti-competitive
effects of state barriers to e-commerce in wine and the availability of non-
discriminatory regulatory alternatives. 7 The forces converged on the Su-
preme Court, filing 26 briefs. Then, on May 16, 2005, the Court released
its decision. The rebels had won a decisive and unequivocal victory for
consumers and the free market. In a broad and sweeping decision, the Su-
5 Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). Ironically, this anti-free market
opinion was written by J. Frank Easterbrook, who was one of the founding scholars of the law and
economics movement.
6 Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Va. 2002).
7 Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
8 Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
9 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
10 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
11 Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
12 Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
13 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
14 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (the court acknowledged that it was taking
the disfavored position and setting up a split in the Circuits).
15 Perhaps the oddest allies in this case were the liquor dealers, evangelists, and high school prin-
cipals who supported the states.
16 Kenneth Starr is now the Dean of the Pepperdine Law School. In 2004, he was in the Washing-
ton office of Kirkland & Ellis. His associates were Kannon Shanmugarn (now a deputy Solicitor-
General), Susan Kearns Engel, Steven Engel, and Jennifer Atkins.
17 Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-commerce:
Wine (July 2003), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter FTC Report]. It is based on "testimony from all sides of the wine issue, including wineries,
wholesalers, state regulators, and a Nobel laureate in economics." Id. at 2.
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preme Court held that trade barriers banning direct shipment of wine or-
dered through e-commerce are unconstitutional.
Now what? The Supreme Court had knocked down trade barriers in
Michigan and New York. Ohio,18 Pennsylvania, 9 Massachusetts, 20 and
Florida2 surrendered. But, in New Jersey,22 Indiana,23 Kentucky, 24 Mary-
land,25 Arkansas,26 Arizona, 27 Maine,28 and Delaware,29 the fighting contin-
ued as lawmakers and their wholesaler allies scurried to shore up their de-
fenses, adopted new strategies, and vowed to fight to the death against
opening the wine market to e-commerce. After all, what state would want
the terrible consequences of an open market-free trade, competition, in-
creased product availability, lower prices, and a diminution in the power
currently held by the cartel of oligopolist wholesalers?
This article will look at the history of wine regulation in the United
States, and what difference Granholm v. Heald makes. Based on the con-
tinued resistance to open markets in a dozen states, it assumes that Gran-
holm was not the end of the fight. Consequently, the article looks ahead
and wonders where the next battles are likely to take place. It will conclude
with thoughts about the continued stability of the underlying structure that
led to the wine wars-the three-tier distribution system that gives so much
power to the wholesalers.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power...
to regulate Commerce ... among the several States . . . ."" Although the
Constitution says nothing about whether states have power to regulate inter-
state commerce simultaneously, the Supreme Court has always held that
this provision grants exclusive power to Congress. The states may not in-
18 Stahl v. Taft, No. 2:03CV597, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17014 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
19 Cutner v. Newman, 398 F. Supp. 2d 389 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
20 Stonington Vineyards v. Jenkins, No. 1:05CV10982 (D. Mass. 2005).
21 Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
22 Freeman v. McGreevey, No. 2:03CV03140 (D.N.J. filed 2003).
23 Baude v. Heath, No. 1:05CV0735, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43947 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
24 Huber Winery v. Wilcher, No. 3:05CV289, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43947 (W.D. Ky. 2006).
25 Bushnell v. Ehrlich, No. 1:05CV03128 (D. Md., case dropped in 2006).
26 Beau v. Moore, No. 4:05CV903 (E.D. Ark. 2005, stayed Sept. 28, 2006).
27 Black Star Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05CV02620 (D. Ariz. filed 2005).
28 Cherry Hill Vineyard v. Baldacci, No. 1:05CV153, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51657 (D. Me.
2006).
29 Hurley v. Minner, No. 1:05CV00826, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69090 (D. Del. 2006).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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terfere with it." This is known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause princi-
ple, first articulated in Gibbons v. Ogden.3 2 Simply put, states cannot dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, provide economic protection to in-
state businesses, erect tariffs or trade barriers to the products of other states,
or otherwise impose significant burdens upon interstate commerce.
The reason is historically obvious. The Framers denied states the
power to erect local trade barriers in "the conviction that in order to suc-
ceed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation."33 The new country
must be made a single economic unit. This was the "one object riding over
every other in the adoption of the Constitution."34 In an oft-quoted passage,
the Court summarized this historical guiding principle as follows:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by cus-
toms duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has
given it reality.
35
The Founders believed that, to succeed as a new nation, the "peoples of the
several states must sink or swim" together as a single national economic
unit.36 This guiding philosophy has evolved into several specific jurispru-
dential principles relevant to state efforts to restrict buying wine over the
Internet.
1. States may not discriminate against interstate commerce
The most obvious principle derived from the dormant Commerce
Clause is that a state may not discriminate against the products of other
states through regulations that give economic advantages to local products
and producers. Such a system is the very essence of the tariff and trade
barrier problem the Founders were trying to eliminate. Therefore, the Su-
31 See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1994); S.C. Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (Commerce Clause "by its own force" prohibits certain
state actions that interfere with interstate commerce).
32 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,231-32, 239 (1824).
33 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
34 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 231 (essential "to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free
from all invidious and partial restraints"). See also West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193
n.9 (1994) (citing James Madison).
35 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
36 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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preme Court has repeatedly held that a state law that discriminates against
interstate commerce "is virtually per se invalid,' 37 and "at a minimum...
invokes the strictest scrutiny."3  There are few constitutional issues on
which the Court has been more consistent and united.39
In the context of commerce, discrimination simply means "differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter,"' or otherwise places an out-of-state product
or producer at a "substantial commercial disadvantage" compared to in-
state products and producers.4 Discrimination does not have to be in-
tended, and the offending statute need not have been enacted in a deliberate
attempt to give in-state interests a competitive advantage. Because the in-
tent of the legislature is not relevant, "a court need not inquire into the pur-
pose or motivation behind a law to determine that, in actuality, it impermis-
sibly discriminates against interstate commerce."42 Instead, discrimination
is a question of the practical impact of a regulation on out-of-state busi-
nesses compared to in-state ones.43 The Court focuses "on whether a chal-
lenged scheme is discriminatory in effect, . . .measured in dollars and
cents, not legal abstractions."'
A regulation is discriminatory if it satisfies any of the following crite-
ria:
37 See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,402 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1988).
39 See S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (discriminatory tax struck down);
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (discriminatory tax struck down); West Lynn Creamery,
Inc., 512 U.S. 186 (discriminatory milk pricing law struck down); Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. 93
(discriminatory solid waste rule struck down); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Ia. Dep't of Revenue & Fin.,
505 U.S. 71 (1992) (discriminatory dividend rule struck down); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (discriminatory landfill law struck down); Chem.
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (discriminatory hazardous waste law struck down);
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (discriminatory tax exemption struck down);
Arnco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (discriminatory tax struck down); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979) (discriminatory wildlife law struck down); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (discriminatory trash shipment rule struck down).
40 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
41 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 275.
42 Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,653 (1994).
43 Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504 U.S. at 344 n.6; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 332; C & A Carbone, Inc.,
511 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44 Associated Indus. of Mo., 511 U.S. at 654.
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a. Products from other states are banned or totally excluded from
the local market. 5
b. The effect of the regulation is to impose higher costs on out-of-
state products than local ones. The Supreme Court has called
state laws that raise the price of out-of-state goods in relation to
in-state goods "paradigmatic examples" of discrimination against
interstate commerce.46
c. The regulation requires out-of-state products to be processed lo-
cally before being sold, distributed or allowed to have market ac-
cess.
47
d. The regulation serves no practical purpose other than "mere eco-
nomic protectionism" of local interests.48
e. The law embargoes local products and prevents them from leav-
ing the state. 9
Discrimination is not justified simply because the regulation also
serves legitimate local concerns. The Court has repeatedly struck down
laws that, in the process of advancing state interests, discriminated against
nonresidents. ° The Court has held that a State can validate a discrimina-
tory law only by showing that the law advances a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.
[When] discrimination against commerce... is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to
justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.... [F]acial
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose, because "the
evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." At a mini-
45 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
46 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994). Accord Or. Waste Sys., Inc., v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
47 C &A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 383.
48 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
49 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
50 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (New York cannot exclude Vermont
dairy products even in the name of protecting public health); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (Oklahoma can-
not embargo its minnows even in the name of protecting a scarce resource); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977) (North Carolina cannot restrict advertising for Washington
apples even to prevent consumer confusion); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey
cannot exclude Pennsylvania garbage to conserve diminishing landfill space); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (Alabama cannot exclude hazardous wastes from other states in the name
of public safety).
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mum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate lo-
cal purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.
51
The burden is upon the state to show not just that regulation is justified, but
that "the discrimination is demonstrably justified."52 Understandably, the
"standards for such justification are high."53  The state must make "the
clearest showing" that there is no nondiscriminatory alternative,54 and its
justification must "pass the 'strictest scrutiny.""'
The Supreme Court has only rarely found that a state has met its bur-
den of proving the need to discriminate against interstate commerce, and
then only upon an extensive factual record clearly demonstrating the ab-
sence of workable alternatives. In Maine v. Taylor,56 the Court upheld a
ban on out-of-state baitfish based on expert testimony that imported baitfish
could introduce non-native parasites that could harm Maine fish and that
there was no known way to prevent it other than a total ban. In Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,57 the Court upheld an embargo against exporting
ground water to other states based on evidence that there was only enough
water for the state's own citizens because of a drought.
2. States may not engage in economic protectionism
The second principle derived from the dormant Commerce Clause is
closely related to the first-States may not engage in economic protection-
ism.5" They may not protect local industry by erecting barriers to interstate
competition,59 nor may they pass laws designed to make sure their own citi-
zens are not at a disadvantage compared to consumers in other states.6"
Although the Court occasionally uses economic protectionism and dis-
crimination interchangeably, the two concepts are slightly different. For
example, a law requiring automobile manufacturers to offer the same re-
bates in Indiana as they offer in Illinois, Ohio, and Kentucky does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, but it does protect the interests of
local car dealers who might otherwise lose customers to big-volume dealers
just across the border in Chicago, Louisville, and Cincinnati. Also, a law
that disadvantages an out-of-state business for the benefit of an in-state
51 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
52 Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504 U.S. at 344 (emphasis in original).
53 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
54 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
55 Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
56 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-43 (1986).
57 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,956-57 (1982).
58 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
59 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
60 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986).
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business of a different type (e.g., out-of-state wineries vs. in-state wholesal-
ers) is not discriminatory, because the two businesses are not similarly situ-
ated, but it is still protectionist.
3. States may not directly regulate interstate commerce
The third principle derived from the dormant Commerce Clause is that
a state's power to regulate commercial transactions stops at the state's bor-
ders. No state may directly regulate interstate commerce or commerce tak-
ing place in other states. Any such extraterritorial effect makes a state regu-
lation virtually per se invalid.
[O]ur cases concerning the extraterritorial effect of state economic regulations stand at a
minimum for the following propositions: First, the "Commerce Clause ... precludes the ap-
plication of a State statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the state .... Second, a statute that directly
controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent
limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extra-
territorial effect was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the practical
effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.
6 1
Under this principle, the Court has invalidated a state law on minimum liq-
uor pricing that had the practical effect of regulating the price at which
manufacturers could sell liquor in other states,62 a state law regulating take-
overs of companies doing business in Illinois that would have affected
some transactions occurring outside the state,63 and a state milk-price statute
that effectively regulated milk prices in neighboring states.' The extraterri-
torial principle is an outgrowth of the nineteenth century doctrine that states
lacked constitutional authority to regulate acts of interstate commerce, that
is, actual shipments of goods in their original packages moving between
states.65
4. States may not unnecessarily burden interstate commerce
The fourth principle derived from the dormant Commerce Clause is
that no state may impose significant economic burdens on interstate com-
merce that exceed the local benefits of regulation. When the state exercises
its police powers to protect public health or its taxing power, e.g., by ban-
61 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
62 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579-80.
63 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
64 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935).
65 Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 496-97 (1888); Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.,
170 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1898).
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ning smoking in public places or imposing high taxes on cigarettes, that
regulation will often serve both a legitimate state interest and have a nega-
tive impact on interstate commerce. Fewer cigarettes will be sold if smok-
ing is banned or the price is raised, harming commerce in tobacco. The
Court recognizes that "incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be
unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its
people."66 If those burdens are significant, however, they may violate the
Commerce Clause even if nondiscriminatory.
When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate conmmerce and regulates
evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. We have also recognized
that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se in-
valid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church67
balancing approach. In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the
statute on both local and interstate activity.
6 s
B. Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages
1. Free Trade in the Nineteenth Century
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, alcoholic beverages were
treated as ordinary commercial products, and the normal principles of dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence applied. In 1886, the Supreme Court
in Walling v. Michigan69 struck down a state law that imposed a tax on non-
residents engaged in the business of selling liquor to be shipped into Michi-
gan, but not on persons whose principle place of business was within the
state. The Court stated that "If this is not a discriminating tax... it is diffi-
cult to conceive of a tax that would be discriminating,"7 ° declared the tax
unconstitutional, and rejected the argument that the tax should be treated
differently because its purpose was to discourage the use of intoxicating
liquors.7 It relied for its holding primarily on a non-liquor case, Welton v.
Missouri,72 involving a tax on traveling peddlers, and there is no suggestion
that the Court thought of sewing machines any differently than bottles of
wine. The taxes were "restraints" that usurped the power of Congress to be
the sole regulator of commerce among the states.
66 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
67 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
68 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,578-79 (1986).
69 Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 460 (1886).
70 Id. at 454.
71 Id. at 459-60.
72 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
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We have so often held that the power given to Congress to regulate commerce... is exclu-
sive in all matters ... especially as regards any impediment or restriction upon such com-
merce, that we deem it necessary merely to refer to our previous decisions on the subject, the
most important of which are collected in Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 631, and need not
be cited here. We have also repeatedly held that so long as Congress does not pass any law
to regulate commerce among the several States, it thereby indicates its will that such com-
merce shall be free and untrammeled; and that any regulation of the subject by the States, ex-
cept in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such freedom.
73
States could restrict the manufacture and sale of alcohol within their own
borders as part of their police power, as long as such regulations did not
affect interstate commerce.74
With the rise of the temperance movement, this distinction between
local regulation and interstate commerce became a problem. The few states
that wanted to restrict liquor were surrounded by states where it was plenti-
ful. As soon as a state passed a dry law, its citizens simply ordered their
liquor from wet states. If the dry states passed laws prohibiting their citi-
zens from ordering alcohol from wet states, the Supreme Court simply
struck them down as restraints upon interstate commerce. In Bowman v.
Chi. & Nw. Ry.,75 the Court held that it was beyond the power of states to
restrict or prohibit the importation of liquor from one state into another.
The Court acknowledged that states could not effectively enforce their own
dry laws unless they could also prohibit imported liquor, but it held that the
Constitution simply did not give states the right to do so.76 The Court ex-
tended this rule to liquor imported for commercial use (re-sale) in Leisy v.
Hardin.77 In the Court's view, a transaction was either part of interstate
commerce or a matter of local concern only; it could not be both.78 Once it
acquired the status of interstate commerce, a package of liquor did not lose
that character until it was opened and mingled with the general property of
a state. As long as it remained in its original package, liquor was therefore
immune from state regulation until sold.79
2. The Wilson Act and its interpretation: 1891-1912
The practical result of Bowman and Leisy was that states could not ef-
fectively enforce their dry laws. Anyone could circumvent them by import-
ing liquor through interstate commerce. To close this loophole, Congress
73 Walling, 116 U.S. at 455.
74 Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 577 (1847); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-63
(1887).
75 Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 499-500 (1888).
76 Id. at 500.
77 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
78 See Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 555 (1891).
79 Leisy, 135 U.S. at 108-10, 119, 124.
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enacted the Wilson Act, which authorized states to regulate imported alco-
hol "to the same extent and in the same manner" as local alcohol." The
Wilson Act provided:
[All] intoxicating liquors ... transported into any State or Territory... shall upon arrival in
such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Ter-
ritory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner
as though such... liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be ex-
empt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.
The Wilson Act had a narrow focus. It was intended merely to over-
turn Bowman and Leisy and close the loophole that allowed residents of dry
states to evade local prohibition by importing their liquor from wet states.
It did not change the basic principle that the dormant Commerce Clause
applied to alcoholic beverages."1
The Wilson Act did not accomplish its purpose, however, because the
Supreme Court construed it narrowly as empowering States to regulate only
the resale of imported alcohol in its original package, not the direct ship-
ment of alcohol to consumers. In Rhodes v. Iowa,2 the Supreme Court re-
visited the same Iowa law that was struck down in Bowman. It construed
the words "upon arrival" in the Wilson Act to mean that state law could
attach to an interstate shipment of liquor only after delivery, and not before.
Therefore, Iowa could not impose its own regulations until the recipient
attempted to re-sell the liquor. Even after crossing state lines, a shipment of
liquor was still interstate commerce, and retained its character as interstate
commerce until delivery was completed. The importation, transportation
and receipt of a package were all core aspects of interstate commerce and
could not be regulated by the states without a clear statement from Con-
gress that it intended to remove the immunity of interstate commerce from
transportation and importation as well as from resale in the original pack-
age.
8 3
The Bowman/Leisy loophole remained largely intact. Although a dry
state could prohibit the resale of imported liquor after it was delivered, the
state was still powerless to stop its citizens from personally evading dry
80 26 STAT. 313, ch. 728 (1890), now codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121.
81 See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 100-01 (1897) ("the state cannot, under the [Wilson Act],
establish a system which ... discriminates between interstate and domestic commerce" in liquor and
creates preferences for domestic products); Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 455-57
(1898) (Wilson Act does not authorize states to burden interstate commerce in liquor through extensive
and inconvenient regulations); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218 (1909) (regulations
barring delivery of alcohol to inebriate could not be enforced against interstate shipper).
82 Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
83 Id. at 423-24. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S.
70 (1912) (regulations barring transportation of alcohol into dry county could not be enforced against an
interstate shipper).
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laws by mail-ordering liquor. As the number of dry states grew, the whole-
sale evasion of those dry laws grew to an estimated 20,000,000 gallons of
liquor per year shipped through interstate commerce.84
3. The Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913
The political pressure from the dry states and the temperance move-
ment to close the Bowman/Leisy/Rhodes loophole was intense, and Con-
gress went back to the drawing board to try again. They came up with the
Webb-Kenyon Act," which provided:
That the shipment or transportation ... of any spirituous ... or other intoxicating liquor of
any kind, from one State ... into any other State ... which... is intended, by any person in-
terested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original
package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State... is hereby prohibited.
The Webb-Kenyon Act, like the Wilson Act before it, had a narrow focus.
It was intended to overturn Bowman, Leisy, and Rhodes. The names of
those cases came up repeatedly during Congressional debates.86 Congress-
man Webb explained that the bill was intended to address the problem that,
"under the present law and decisions, no State can interfere with the inter-
state shipment of liquor until it has been actually delivered to the consignee
[and] no State official is permitted to touch any interstate shipment of liquor
[even if] consigned to a 'blind tiger,'87 'bootlegger,' or 'speak-easy."' 88
Senator Kenyon likewise explained that the bill was intended simply to
remove the immunity afforded to interstate transportation of liquor under
the Commerce Clause, and to allow dry States to prevent their citizens from
evading local prohibition.
I am not concerned at all with the question of whether a State in the exercise of its police
power might adopt a law prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. If it
does do so, it ought to be able to make that law effective.... If intoxicating liquors can be
freely shipped into a State which has a prohibitory law and the State government is power-
less to prevent it ... then, indeed, it is time for some further amendment to our Constitu-
tion.
89
84 49 CONG. REC. 699-700 (1912) (statements of Sen. Sanders).
85 37 STAT. 699, codified as 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
86 See 49 CONG. REC. at 764-67; 49 CONG. REC. 2529, 2689-90, 2794-96, 2807, 2817, 2834,
2909-10 (1913).
87 A blind tiger was a restaurant that sold illegal liquor. The name supposedly derives from the
practice of placing a stuffed tiger in the window or on the tables to alert patrons that bootleg booze was
available in the back room. See SINCLAIR LEWIS, ELMER GANTRYpassim (1927).
88 H.R. REP. No. 62-1461, at 2.
89 49 CONG. REC. 761 (1912).
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No one at the time understood Webb-Kenyon to delegate power to
states to discriminate against, burden, or regulate interstate commerce, be-
cause such delegation was thought to be beyond the power of Congress. At
the time of Webb-Kenyon, the understanding was that state regulation of
alcohol under the police power and federal regulation under the commerce
power were mutually exclusive. Each had absolute authority within its own
sphere. Congress could not constitutionally delegate authority to states to
regulate interstate commerce.9" Instead, Congress exercised its own author-
ity over commerce to prohibit shipments of alcohol from wet to dry states,
depriving them of their character as interstate commerce. That way, states
could regulate such shipments as soon as they crossed the border under
their police powers.91 The limited purpose of the Webb-Kenyon Act is
clear from its title: "An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate
character in certain cases"-namely those covered by Bowman, Leisy and
Rhodes, where alcohol was being shipped into a dry state.92
Nor did anyone at the time suggest that the Webb-Kenyon Act would
change the Walling v. Michigan rule that wet states could not discriminate
against interstate commerce in liquor. 3 No one suggested that it changed
the rule in Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.' and Adams Express Co. v. Ken-
tucky,95 that wet states in which liquor was legal could not burden or regu-
late interstate commerce in liquor. In the debates in Congress, in which
Bowman and Rhodes were repeatedly mentioned, these other lines of cases
are not mentioned at all. Indeed, when Senator Root expressed concern
over the scope of the Act,' he was assured by his colleagues that the bill
was a narrow one that merely allowed dry states to prohibit imports upon
90 49 CONG. REc. 767 (1912) (statements of Sen. Kenyon); id. at 2912 (statements of Sen. Thorn-
ton).
91 Id. at 2912-13 (statements of Sen. Kenyon); id. at 2917 (statements of Sen. Stone).
92 37 STAT. 699, ch. 90 (1913) (emphasis added).
93 Indeed, there were few such laws. Webb-Kenyon was passed in 1913, at the height of the
temperance movement. Several states had adopted state-wide prohibition. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §
1770nn (1907); N.C. REV. LAWS § 2058 (Pell 1908). Most other state liquor codes focused on local
option laws that gave communities the power to ban the sale and use of alcohol. E.g., MASS. REV.
LAWS ch. 100, §§ 13, 48 (1902); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2927 et seq. (1915); ANN. CONSOL. LAWS OF
N.Y., §§ 13, 23 (1917); GEN. CODE OHIO §§ 6097,6108 et seq. (1910); S.D. REV. CODE § 2856 (1903);
PIERCE'S WASH. CODE § 5713 (1905). A few laws prohibited shipments into dry areas by anyone, but
neither discriminated against out-of-state sellers nor imposed burdensome regulations on them. E.g.,
KY. STAT. §§ 2554, 2557a, 2569a (Carroll 1915); ANN. CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y., §§ 13, 23 (1917). The
remaining state liquor laws were classic police power regulations, aimed at moral issues that did not
implicate interstate commerce, e.g., banning sales to minors and habitual drunkards, MO. STAT. ANN. §
3017, outlawing sales to Indians, e.g., ANN. CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. § 29 (1917); and prohibiting such
unseemly activities as women playing banjos in saloons. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2906 (1915).
94 Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
95 Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218 (1909).
96 49CONG. REc. 2915 (1913).
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the same terms as they prohibit domestic sales.97 The bill would only "re-
move the restrictions which now bind the action of the States in their efforts
to honestly enforce their lawful prohibition enactments,"98 by "imposing the
condition that the goods shall be so subjected to the laws of a State [but] not
in any sense whatever delegating authority to the State to control by its leg-
islation interstate commerce."99
There were few opportunities for the courts to interpret Webb-Kenyon
in the six years from when it was enacted to when it was mooted by Prohi-
bition. The few cases that were decided adhered to the view that the Act
merely gave states power to ban direct shipments of alcohol into dry areas,
overturning Bowman and finally closing the loophole that had allowed citi-
zens in dry states to evade local prohibition laws through interstate com-
merce. The Act had no application beyond that."° The Supreme Court held
that it did not give states power to prohibit shipments into counties where
possession and use of alcohol was legal,'O and did not change the general
rule that the States may not regulate commerce wholly interstate.
It would be difficult to frame language more plainly indicating the purpose of Congress ....
Such shipments are prohibited only when ... they shall be possessed, sold or used in viola-
tion of any law of the State wherein they are received. Thus far and no farther has Congress
seen fit to extend the prohibitions of the Act in relation to interstate shipments.
10 2
4. Prohibition
In 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, and the "Noble Ex-
periment" ' 3 of nationwide Prohibition began. Section 1 provided:
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
hereby prohibited.
97 Id. at 2916 (statements of Sen. Stone).
98 Id. at 2807 (statements of Rep. Webb).
99 Id. at 702 (statements of Sen. McCumber).
100 James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 322 (1917) (Act's "only purpose
was to give effect to state prohibition" laws). See also Brennen v. S. Express Co., 90 S.E. 402 (S.C.
1916) (Act does not apply unless there is a state law prohibiting receipt, possession, sale, or use of
liquor); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 142 (1932) (Act "referred to the prohibitory laws of
the States, the enforcement of which it was intended to aid").
101 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298, 303 (1917).
102 Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 199 (1915) (emphasis added).
103 The phrase is generally attributed to Herbert Hoover. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN
QUOTATIONS 104 (1991) (1928 letter to Sen. Borah).
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY
The Amendment had three big loopholes. First, it did not prohibit
possession or consumption of liquor. Second, it gave everyone wealthy
enough to do so (such as the Senators themselves) one year to stock their
personal wine cellars so they could take advantage of the first loophole.
Third, it was limited to sale "for beverage purposes," and did not prohibit
selling alcohol for medicinal purposes, so that even those who could not
afford to stock their cellars under the second loophole could at least get a
prescription for whiskey to calm their nerves and help ward off the flu.
Section 2 provided:
The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this Article by
appropriate legislation.
This simple provision altered the Constitution in a significant way. For the
first time, it gave Congress police power. The traditional wall of separation
between state police power and federal commerce power had been
breached.
C. The Twenty-First Amendment and the Repeal of Prohibition
Prohibition was, of course, a national disaster. The idea was absurd
from the beginning, and it was so widely ignored, evaded, and corrupted,
and ran so contrary to basic American notions of individual liberty, that it
delegitimized the entire U.S. legal system.
[The] Eighteenth Amendment . . . is the first provision ever written into the Constitution
which affects directly the life and habits of the people.... [T]housands of people who never
drank before started immediately to drink as a protest against this infringement of their per-
sonal liberty. 104
Prohibition survived barely 13 years. Congress drafted the Twenty-First
Amendment to repeal it in 1933, and it was ratified by state conventions
later that same year.0 5
104 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: STATE CONVENTION RECORDS AND LAWS 191 (Everett S. Brown ed., 1938) [hereinafter
RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT] (statement of Mr. Darnall, President of Maryland
Convention). See also 76 CONG. REC. 4514 (1933) (Rep. LaGuardia arguing for repeal "because of the
widespread violation of the law by the criminal element [and the] universal disregard of the law by well-
meaning, law-abiding people.").
105 Article V of the Constitution provides that Amendments may be ratified either by 3/4 of the
state legislatures, or by conventions in 3/4 of the states. Although repeal had wide popular support, the
drafters feared the state legislatures were too easily captured by the temperance movement and would be
reluctant to vote for repeal once it was cast as a moral issue, so they took the unusual step of writing into
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Section 1 of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth,
and national prohibition ended. But, what about state prohibition? Several
states wished to remain dry, as they had been before Prohibition, and they
feared a return to the Bowman/Leisy/Rhodes doctrine under which they
would be powerless to prevent their citizens from evading local dry laws
through interstate commerce."' Merely re-enacting the Webb-Kenyon Act
might not be adequate because it could be repealed by Congress or held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Senator Borah reminded his col-
leagues that the constitutionality of Webb-Kenyon had initially been sus-
tained only by a divided Court, its continued constitutionality was in doubt,
and the Congress could not be counted on to maintain it indefinitely."7
So, Congress added section 2 to the Amendment to write Webb-
Kenyon into the Constitution permanently.0" It provides:
The transportation or importation into any State... for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
This language is virtually identical to the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. §
122:
The shipment or transportation ... of any... intoxicating fiquor.., from one State... into
any other State... to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used ... in violation of
any law of such State... is hereby prohibited.
The legislative history shows without doubt that the purpose of Sec-
tion 2 was the same as Webb-Kenyon-"to assure the so-called dry States
against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States."'0 9 Senator
Blaine reiterated this point many times during his introduction of the
Amendment, stating that "[t]he Committee felt ... that we could well af-
ford to guarantee to the so-called dry States the protection designed by Sec-
tion two," and "I am willing to grant to the dry States full measure of pro-
the Twenty-First Amendment the requirement that it be ratified by state conventions. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 3. It is the only Amendment to ever have been ratified in this manner.
106 See 76 CONG. REC. 4170-71 (1933) (Senator Borah argued that after repeal, the dry states
would need to be able to fend off attempts to evade their prohibition laws by illegally importing alcohol
as had been allowed under the Bowman/Rhodes line of cases); id. at 4171 (Senator Wagner argued that
the Amendment should give "the dry States ... assurance that they will be protected" from decisions
like Bowman).
107 76 CONG. REC. 4170.
108 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine on behalf of drafting committee); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976).
109 76 CONG. REC. at 4141 (statement of Sen. Blaine on behalf of drafting committee). See also
Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49
DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631-36 (2000) (reviewing historical reasons for enactment of Section 2).
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tection, and thus prohibit the wet States from interfering in their internal
affairs respecting the control of intoxicating liquors."''  The House spon-
sor, Rep. Robinson, repeated the same message, stating that "Section 2 at-
tempts to protect dry States."''. Every other House member to speak on
Section 2 specifically agreed that its purpose was to aid and protect dry
states in permitting them, if they wish, to exclude all liquor traffic in their
domain." 2
Congress also made it clear that the Amendment had nothing to do
with interstate commerce among wet states. Senator Glass, who wrote Sec-
tion 2, explained its limitation:
Liquors may be shipped across a State in interstate commerce from one wet State to another
wet State, but [Section 2] as I have drafted it prohibits the shipment of intoxicatng liquors
into a State whose laws prohibit the manufacture, sale, or transportation 
of liquors.
In the state ratifying conventions, the delegates consistently delivered
the same message: Prohibition had been a societal and legal disaster. So-
cially, it had trampled on individual liberties, done nothing to advance tem-
perance, led to rampant crime, and caused widespread disrespect for author-
ity. Legally, it had upset the natural order of things by violating the sacred
principle that only the states, not the federal government, could exercise the
police power. The delegates called for a return of the police power to the
states so that they could regulate alcohol in ways that promoted temperance
realistically without infringing individual liberty.
The core concern of the state delegates was temperance. It is men-
tioned in 17 of the 19 recorded debates" 4 and by almost every speaker. For
example, Gov. Cross of Connecticut said the Amendment would "promote
temperance."" 5 Mr. Marshall of Indiana said that "prohibition did not bring
temperance," but its repeal would." 6 Gov. Ritchie of Maryland said repeal
was a "victory in the interest of temperance in the true sense."" 7 Mr. Butler
of New York said, "With repeal, the movement for true temperance will be
resumed."' Gov. Comstock of Michigan said, "We want a regulated traf-
fic in liquor, one that makes for temperance and not for license."" 9 Similar
'10 76 CONG. REC. at 4141.
111 Id. at 4518.
112 Id. at 4523 (Rep. McSwain); id, at 4526 (Rep. Tierny); id. at 4159 (Rep. Garber).
113 Id. at4219.
114 Only nineteen of thirty-eight states kept records of their debates, which are collected in
RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104.
1"' Id. at 62.
116 Id. at 142.
117 Id. at 194.
118 Id. at304.
119 Id. at 229.
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sentiments were expressed by delegates in Idaho, 2' Missouri,'21 Colorado,'
Florida, 23 Iowa, 24 Kentucky," New Jersey, 126 Utah,2 7 Virginia,1 28 and
Washington. 9 In New York, the convention ended with Rev. Quinn call-
ing on God to "direct our people to the true idea of temperance and sobri-
ety."'30 Interestingly, some delegates thought that the promotion of low-
alcohol drinks like beer and wine in lieu of hard liquor was the key to tem-
perance. 3'
Delegates also expressed concern that the Eighteenth Amendment had
given police power to the federal government. This violated the natural
constitutional order in which states had exclusive police power. The wis-
dom of this natural order had been confirmed by the total ineptitude of the
federal government's attempts to stop bootlegging during Prohibition. To
many delegates, this was the more important issue,3' and it found expres-
sion in 13 of the 19 recorded conventions. Mr. Montgomery of Pennsyl-
vania said that "the Constitution of the United States was most wise in re-
serving to the several states the police power and in delegating or granting
no police power to the Federal Government," and that the Twenty-First
Amendment would restore this traditional balance.'33 Mr. Wadsworth of
New York said that prohibition had "invited the states to surrender a very
important part of their police power."" Mr. Riter of Utah said that prohibi-
tion "transferred from the states to the federal government police power in
regard to control and prohibition of personal conduct of citizens."'35 Simi-
lar remarks were made by delegates in Illinois,'36 New Jersey,'37 Iowa, 38
120 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 100 (expressing the
need to adopt policy "which will promote true temperance").
121 Id. at 249 ("I take it that all of you believe in temperance.").
122 Id. at 41 (declaring that "we must work for a new form of temperance").
123 Id. at 70 (stating that "we are fighting the battles of temperance").
124 Id. at 153 (defining the vote as "for temperance as opposed to prohibition").
125 Id. at 166 ("We shall have before us the duty [to] teach... temperance.").
126 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 281 ("promoting tem-
perance").
127 Id. at 401 (declaring the need to "find new ways for encouraging temperance").
128 Id. at 439 (noting that "prohibition retarded rather than promoted temperance").
129 Id. at 457 (recommending to "re-establish the broad teachings of temperance").
130 Id. at 319.
131 Id. at 281,299.
132 See 76 CONG. REC. 4144 (1933) (statements of Sen. Wagner) ("The question which has trou-
bled the American people since the eighteenth amendment was added to the Constitution was not at all
concerned with liquor. It was a question of government; how to restore the constitutional balance of
power and authority in our Federal system which had been upset by national prohibition.").
133 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 355.
134 Id. at 305.
135 Id. at 411.
136 id. at 112.
137 id. at 282.
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Kentucky,'39 Michigan,'" New York,"' and Virginia,' and by members of
Congress.'43
Section 2 was not seen as creating a new order. The states wanted the
old order restored, in which they had exclusive police power and the federal
government had exclusive power over interstate commerce. Mr. Byrnes of
Missouri said, "You are here to restore to its original purity, that sacred
civil document, the Constitution of these United States."'" Mr. Thatcher of
New York, referring to the allocation of police power exclusively to the
states, said, "[T]here are certain cardinal principles in the Constitution of
the United States that must not be violated, and with that realization, may
there be a final end to all experiments involving that great document."'45
Mrs. Gaylord of Missouri called for "the return to each state of its former
right to regulate and control the manufacture, sale and transportation of
intoxicating beverages within its own borders.""' Mr. Robinson of Con-
necticut said the Twenty-First Amendment would "return to the people of
the several states ... their constitutional right to govern themselves in their
internal affairs."' 47 Mrs. Todd of Kentucky said that the "very essence of
Repeal is that the people of the States shall again be allowed to legislate for
themselves in matters concerning control and regulation of alcoholic bever-
ages.' 48
State delegates pledged to exercise their reclaimed police power over
alcohol in ways that would promote temperance without unduly infringing
individual rights. Mr. Goolrick of Virginia said that the "failure of prohibi-
tion... may be found in the fact that it was ... restrictive of the individual
rights and privileges of the people."'49 To avoid making the same mistake,
Mr. Goolrick recommended that the new system should be "liberal but at
the same time ... tend to promote temperance."' 50 Mr. Haldeman of Ken-
tucky proclaimed that the new system would restore "the personal liberty of
138 Id. at 160.
139 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 169.
140 Id. at 228.
141 Id. at 293-94, 306.
142 Id. at 439.
143 See the Congressional debates over a proposed section three to the Twenty-First Amendment
which would have given Congress concurrent police power to regulate alcohol, but the idea was roundly
criticized. 76 CONG. REc. 4144, 4143-46 (1933) (statements of Sens. Blaine, Walsh and Wagner); id. at
4155 (statements of Sens. Walsh and Brookhart); id. at 4161-62 (statements of Sens. Brookhart and
Norris); id. at 4173 (statements of Sens. Borah and Black).
144 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 260 (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 293-94.
146 Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 439.
150 RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 104, at 439-40.
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the American citizen."'' Gov. Ritchie of Maryland pledged that now "the
safeguards of the liberties of the American people were going to be pre-
served and maintained." ' Gov. Comstock of Michigan said that "we have
decided to go back and try personal liberty once more, the personal liberty
we had before Prohibition."'53 Given this history, it is ironic that modem
state officials are arguing that this Amendment justifies their efforts to re-
strict individual liberty in a way that does not promote temperance.
D. Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages After the Twenty-First Amendment
Interpreting and applying Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to
state regulation of commerce in liquor turned out to be harder than its legis-
lative history would suggest. Section 2 says that:
" The transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors into any
State
" for delivery or use therein
" in violation of the laws thereof
" is hereby prohibited.
In historical context, the meaning is clear-the transportation or importa-
tion of liquor from a wet state into a dry state is prohibited. But the courts
have not always approached the interpretation of this Amendment from a
historical perspective. If one looks just at the text, three problems of inter-
pretation arise.
First, does the power to "prohibit" transportation and importation in-
clude the lesser power to "allow but heavily regulate" transportation and
importation?"5
Second, what phrase does "in violation of the laws thereof' modify?
If it modifies the words "delivery or use therein," then the Twenty-First
Amendment authorizes a state to prohibit importation only in the narrow
circumstances that the importation would violate laws relating to the deliv-
ery or use of alcohol. Relatively few state regulations would be justified.
151 Id. at 169.
152 Id. at 193.
153 Id. at 228.
154 Compare State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936) ("Surely the
State may adopt a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition."), with Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-
Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The greater power to forbid imports does not imply a lesser
power to allow imports on discriminatory terms.").
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On the other hand, if the phrase "in violation of the laws thereof' modifies
the words "transportation and importation," a quite different meaning
emerges-states have the power to prohibit importation, if the importation
would violate the laws relating to transportation and importation. Such a
reading would justify a broad range of state regulation on interstate com-
merce.
Third, what is the meaning of the word "laws"? Although the drafters
and ratifiers understood it to mean "dry laws" only, the text does not con-
tain that limitation. If interpreted to mean all laws, then the Amendment is
far more sweeping.
1. The early "broad power" cases
Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, the
Supreme Court decided three cases on the amendment's scope: State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co.,55 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Comm'n,'56 and Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves.'57 In Young's Mkt. Co., the
Court ignored the legislative and ratification history of the Amendment and
looked only at its text:
The plaintiffs argue that limitation of the broad language of the Twenty-First Amendment is
sanctioned by its history; and by the decisions of this Court on the Wilson Act [and] the
Webb-Kenyon Act.... As we think the language of the Amendment is clear, we do not dis-
cuss these matters. 158
The Court held that Section 2 gave states broad power to regulate liquor
and interpreted the power to "prohibit" as also including the power to
"adopt a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition."'59 That regula-
tion could include attaching conditions to the act of transportation itself," °
and state power was not limited to enforcing dry laws. 6' The early cases
gave the Amendment such a broad reading that it looked like states could
regulate, restrict, and burden interstate sales and deliveries of liquor in any
155 Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
156 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
157 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
158 Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 63-64.
159 See id. at 63.
160 See id. at 62 (finding that the Amendment confers "upon the State the power to forbid all im-
portations which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.").
161 See id. (finding that plaintiffs "request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: The
State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale
within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors compete with
the domestic on equal terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a
rewriting of it.").
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way they wanted, "unfettered by the Commerce Clause" 162 -perhaps even
allowing discrimination against out-of-state interests. 1
63
2. The modem "limited power" cases
Almost immediately after its trio of cases in the 1930s that gave the
Twenty-First Amendment a broad non-historical reading, the Supreme
Court began to retreat from that extreme position. In William Jameson &
Co. v. Morgenthau, the Court rejected the proposition that "the Twenty-
First Amendment ... gives to the States complete and exclusive control
over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by the Commerce
Clause."'" It held in U.S. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., a restraint-of-trade
case involving liquor price fixing in Colorado, that the Twenty-First
Amendment "has not given the states plenary and exclusive power to regu-
late the conduct of persons doing an interstate liquor business."'65 What-
ever impact the Amendment had, state power was not "unfettered" by the
Commerce Clause as unwisely suggested in Ziffrin. The federal Commerce
power was unaffected, and its scope was limited to dormant Commerce
Clause issues.'66
The Court also made it clear that the Twenty-First Amendment gave
states no authority to infringe upon constitutionally protected areas other
than commerce, such as equal protection, free speech, the Establishment
Clause, due process, or the import-export clause. In Dep't of Revenue v.
James B. Beam Distilling Co., the Court struck down a Kentucky law tax-
ing Scotch whisky that violated the export-import clause. 167  The Young's
Market cases were relegated to a brief footnote. In Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, the Court struck down a Wisconsin law permitting the sheriff to
issue notices forbidding the sale of alcohol to habitual drunkards without
giving them an opportunity to be heard as violating Due Process. 6 ' In
162 Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 138-39.
163 See Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 63 (stating in dicta that a state might "permit the domestic
manufacture of beer and exclude all made without the State"). At the same time, the Court was careful
to say that it was not deciding the discrimination issue and was not stating a general principle that state
regulatory power was unlimited. See id. at 62 (finding the case did not present a question of discrimina-
tion prohibited by the Commerce Clause); Indianapolis Brewing Co v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305
U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (declining to consider the issue of discrimination); Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at
64 (stating that the Amendment had not "freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power").
164 William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939).
165 U.S. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
166 See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938) (state could not regulate
liquor headed for Yosemite National Park); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S.
324 (1964) (state could not regulate sale of duty-free liquor at airport).
167 Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964).
168 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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Craig v. Boren, the Court struck down an Oklahoma law setting the beer
drinking age at 21 for males and 18 for females as violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, commenting that the Twenty-First Amendment was simply
irrelevant to anything other than commerce.'69 In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that permitted nearby
churches to veto the issuance of liquor licenses as violating the Establish-
ment Clause, dismissing the Twenty-First Amendment issue in a cursory
footnote. 7° And, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court struck
down a Rhode Island law prohibiting liquor advertising as violating the
First Amendment, commenting that the Twenty-First Amendment did not
give states license to violate other provisions of the Constitution.'
The tone of the Court's discussion of the Twenty-First Amendment
also changed-from commenting on its broad authority to commenting on
its obvious limitations. Thus, in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp.,' in which the Court held that states could not regulate duty-free
liquor at airports, the Court acknowledged the "broad-power" language of
the Young's Market trio, but then said:
To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-First Amendment has somehow operated to "re-
peal" the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would,
however, be an absurd oversimplification.... Both the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and in-
terests at stake in any concrete case.
173
In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, '74 the Court stated:
The Court has rejected the view that the Twenty-First Amendment has somehow operated to
'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned. In-
stead, the Court has engaged in a pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.
The question in each case is "whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so
closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-First Amendment that the regulation
may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal poli-
cies." 
175
Despite this retrenchment, the Court left the Young's Market cases
themselves untouched for fifty years. Then, in the 1980s, it revisited the
169 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-09 (1976).
170 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
171 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
172 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
173 Id. at 331-32. The language is quoted favorably in later cases, see, e.g., Bacchus Imps. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
584 (1986).
174 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
175 Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted).
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core question of the balance between the Twenty-First Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause in another trio of cases: Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias,'76 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,77 and
Healy v. Beer Institute.7' This time, the result was quite different.
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court took up the issue left open
by Young's Market: Can states discriminate against interstate commerce
and give economic protection to local liquor producers? At issue was a
Hawaii law that imposed a 20% tax on liquor imported from other states,
but which exempted locally-produced brandy, rum, and wine. Fifty years
earlier, the Court had intimated that such a law would be constitutional.179
Now it held to the contrary, that the law was discriminatory and protection-
ist and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause. This time, the
Court took into account the history of its passage and ratification, and found
nothing in either the text or the history of the Twenty-First Amendment
suggesting that it had given states absolute power over alcohol or had dis-
placed the nondiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Indeed, it held quite clearly that "one thing is certain: the central purpose of
the provision was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by
erecting barriers to competition."' 80 The Court retreated from the rhetoric
of early cases that state power was unlimited and unfettered. Instead, it
wrote of a limited Twenty-First Amendment that gave states power to regu-
late only when state interest clearly outweighed the federal interest in unre-
strained interstate commerce, saying "It is by now clear that the Amend-
ment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from
the ambit of the Commerce Clause."''8
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., the
Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment also did not authorize states
to regulate interstate commerce directly and that liquor laws with "extrater-
ritorial" effect violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The New York law
at issue effectively fixed nationwide liquor prices by providing that no dis-
tiller could sell liquor to a New York distributor at a price higher than the
price charged anywhere else. Since several other states also had such laws,
their combined effect provided that no distiller could sell its liquor any-
where at a discount. Thus, a few state laws controlled liquor prices every-
where. The Court held that "When a state statute directly regulates ... in-
terstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute with-
176 Bacchus, 468 U.S. 263.
177 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. 573.
178 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
179 State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936) (dictum) (A state "may
permit the domestic manufacture of beer and.., subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fee.").
180 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275.
181 Id.
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out further inquiry" as violating the dormant Commerce Clause."2 The
Twenty-First Amendment did not alter this rule.
In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Court reiterated the holdings of Bacchus
and Brown-Forman that, if a state liquor law discriminated against inter-
state commerce, regulated commerce in other states, or provided economic
protection to local businesses, it was invalid. Healy involved a price affir-
mation law like the one in Brown-Forman, which was also discriminatory
because it did not require in-state distillers to make such an affirmation.
The Court held the law unconstitutional and concluded that it could not be
saved by the Twenty-First Amendment. 183
3. Dicta in non-Commerce Clause cases
At the same time the Supreme Court was whittling down the scope of
the Twenty-First Amendment in dormant Commerce Clause cases, it was
inserting contrary dicta in non-Commerce Clause cases. Even while it was
striking down every restrictive liquor law that came before it, the Court was
paying lip service to the old rule that states had virtually unlimited power to
regulate commerce in liquor. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., the Court struck down a price-posting statute as
violating the Sherman Act, despite saying that "The Twenty-First Amend-
ment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit
importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution
system.''""4 In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, the Court struck down an
Oklahoma law prohibiting cable TV companies from broadcasting liquor
commercials as violating the Federal Communications Act, despite saying
that "[t]he States enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their
borders."'85 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court struck down
a state law prohibiting advertising the sale price of liquor on First Amend-
ment grounds, despite saying that "the Twenty-First Amendment... grants
the States authority over commerce."' 86
182 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.
183 Healy, 491 U.S. at 341-42.
184 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
185 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,712 (1984).
186 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 515 (1996). See also North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990) (Supremacy Clause case; dictum in plurality opinion that
"within the area of its jurisdiction, the State has 'virtually complete control' over the importation and
sale of liquor and the structure of the liquor distribution system." (Citing Young's Market Co.)).
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4. The (brief) re-emergence of the Webb-Kenyon Act
The Webb-Kenyon Act had been re-enacted in 1935 following the re-
peal of Prohibition,'87 but it was assumed to be superfluous because it du-
plicated the language of the Twenty-First Amendment. If the Twenty-First
Amendment were not strong enough to sustain the constitutionality of a
restrictive state liquor law, then a mere statute could not save it. The
Webb-Kenyon Act was therefore ignored for 60 years. It was not men-
tioned in a single Supreme Court liquor case after 1936 except as a histori-
cal curiosity.' 8 Despite these less than sterling credentials, the states re-
discovered Webb-Kenyon when looking for ways to defend their discrimi-
natory wine shipping regimes. They argued that when Congress passed the
Act, it had delegated power to states to regulate commerce in alcoholic
beverages as they saw fit, even in ways that discriminated against interstate
commerce.
The argument was implausible. Nothing in the Act specifically says
that states may discriminate against interstate commerce in liquor, and the
legislative history reflects universal agreement in Congress that Webb-
Kenyon did no such thing.'8 9 The usual rule is that the courts will not read a
Congressional statute as authorizing discrimination unless such intent is
clearly and unequivocally stated that "Congress certainly has the power to
authorize state regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce, but we will not assume that it has done so unless such intent is
clearly expressed."' 9 Indeed, the one previous time this argument had been
made, the Supreme Court rejected it in a cursory footnote.'9 '
187 37 STAT. 699, ch. 740 (1935).
188 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 333 n.1 1 (1964); Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345
n.7 (1964).
189 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
190 Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (citations omitted); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992) (States' authority to discriminate must be expressed with "unambigu-
ous intent" by Congress); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992) (Congress must manifest
"unambiguous intent" to allow States to discriminate).
191 James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. at 345 n.7 ("There is nothing in ... the language of
either the Wilson Act or the Webb-Kenyon Act to support the view that Congress intended by those
laws to consent to state taxation upon importation of liquor.").
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Ell. THE WINE WAR
A. Background
1. History of the three-tier system
Before Prohibition, there had been competition in the alcoholic bever-
age trade, which led to (gasp!) lower prices, abundant product availability,
and lots of beer-drinking. Everyone was happy, except those in the temper-
ance movement. After Repeal, supporters of temperance argued that all the
free trade and unregulated competition that had existed before Prohibition
was responsible for excessive consumption, and if we did not want to return
to the sinful days of the "saloon," we'd better find a way to restrict compe-
tition, raise prices and reduce availability. So, the states created the three-
tier system-manufacturers had to sell only to wholesalers who sold to re-
tailers, and no one could have any business interest in more than one tier.
Competition among wholesalers was outlawed. Prices were fixed. And
there were plenty of local entities handling liquor the states could tax.
Exactly what "problem" the three-tier system was supposed to solve
was unclear. Its advocates talked about preventing the return of those nine-
teenth century dens of iniquity called "saloons," but creating three distribu-
tion tiers was irrelevant to this issue. It also did not work; saloons are quite
common in most cities. Its advocates also talked about preventing a return
to the evil of the "tied house," an arrangement whereby a beer manufacturer
would directly own and control a pub or inn that sold only its products.
Why anyone thought this was an evil is not explained anywhere-the only
argument advanced was that the manufacturer would pressure the innkeeper
to sell as much beer as possible, leading to excessive drinking, but the ar-
gument is absurd. Was the assumption that the innkeeper would otherwise
try not to sell beer, thereby going broke? Anyone in the business of selling
alcohol is driven by the same profit motive-to sell as much as possible.
Creating a three tier system does not miraculously turn manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers into board members of the Temperance League.
In any event, the three-tier system did not end tied houses-it just tied them
to wholesalers instead of manufacturers.
Two justifications for the system are most plausible. First, because
organized crime had taken over broad control of all aspects of the liquor
industry during Prohibition, creating multiple tiers and prohibiting owner-
ship in more than one tier could dilute the mob's post-Prohibition influence.
Second, the creation of a mandatory wholesale distributor system gave the
states a local, easily taxed entity, helping raise revenue that was sorely
needed after five years of the Great Depression.
The three-tier system made the wine war inevitable. If all wine must
pass through a local wholesaler to reach consumers, it creates a bottleneck.
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When there are too many wineries and too few wholesalers, the system will
fail because the wholesalers will service the large volume producers and the
small wineries will be frozen out of access to the market if they are denied
direct access. Their only recourse will be a legal war.
2. The wine industry today
The inevitable happened, of course. There are now 25,000 different
wines produced in the United States. There are more than 4,000 wineries.'92
Consumer interest and demand has skyrocketed,'93 and the three-tier system
cannot handle it. The number of wholesalers is steadily shrinking. Com-
pared to the 1960s, there are now six times as many wineries but only one-
sixth the number of wholesalers."9 That has turned the three-tier distribu-
tion system into the three-tier non-distribution system. What started out as
a system to allow controlled and regulated distribution has become its ma-
jor obstacle.
Of the 25,000 wines, only about 500 make it through the system to re-
tail shelves. Fifty large wineries dominate the market and provide 90% of
the wine that is handled by the three-tier system. Fewer than 100 wineries
have stable national distribution in any form.'95 Three thousand wineries
have no wholesaler at all, even in local markets. Small wineries can some-
times obtain temporary wholesale distribution to major markets developing
a consumer demand without the product actually being available-for ex-
ample, by being mentioned favorably several times in a publication such as
Wine Spectator-but nothing will get those wines to Indiana or Arkansas.1"'
Without a wholesaler, a winery may sell only to tourists who stop by, and in
small quantities to individual consumers by direct shipment.
However, state regulatory systems were not set up for direct shipping.
All sales were supposed to go through wholesalers. In 1986, California
passed the first law permitting direct shipments, but only from states that,
192 Brief for WineAmerica et al. at 5-6, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). Most of the
growth in wineries has taken place outside of California, in states like Oregon, Texas, Michigan, New
York, and Washington. In Texas alone, the number of wineries has gone from six in 1980 to ninety-one
today. There are now wineries in all fifty states.
193 The circulation of the Wine Spectator has gone from 150,000 in 1994 to nearly 375,000 in 2004
with a readership of more than one million. Wine Spectator Advertising Information: Paid Circulation
Has Grown Rapidly, WINE SPECTATOR (2003), available at http://www.winespectator.comfWine/
Images/Graphics/ads/WSNATEKIT.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
194 At its peak, there were around 5,000 wholesalers. Now there are approximately 400. Alan E.
Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Market and Nonmarket Barriers to Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia,
6:2 BUSINESS AND POLITICS at 5 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol6/iss2/art4 (last
visited Aug. 21, 2007); FTC Report, supra note 17, at 6.
195 Wiseman & Ellig, supra note 194, at 5.
196 See FTC Report, supra note 17, at 23-25.
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on a reciprocal basis, allowed its citizens to import California wines.'97 A
dozen other states passed similar laws.'98 A few states began to allow direct
shipping more generally,'99 and a few allowed its citizens to ship back wine
purchased in person on site at the winery's tasting room.2° Most states
refused to permit any form of direct shipping, though. Wine could only be
distributed by wholesalers, even if that meant 3,000 wineries were kept out
of the market.
Foreclosed from national distribution, many small wineries turned
their attention to developing a local market. In many areas, they have be-
come valuable local resources, bringing employment and tourism to eco-
nomically depressed rural areas. They are credited with transforming the
economy of the Finger Lakes district of New York, the Willamette Valley
of Oregon, and the Columbia River Valley in Washington. They generate
new tax revenues for the states. They attract tourists and contribute as an-
chor sites in tourist areas, by offering restaurants, bed-and-breakfasts, inns,
boutiques, and craft businesses. For every $3 a winery receives in gross
revenue from all sources, tourists will add roughly $1 to the local econ-
omy.2°' Accordingly, the states began to find ways to assist the growth of
local wineries--creating wine grape councils, wine trails, reduced license
fees, and the right to sell directly on the premises without having to find a
wholesaler.
3. The Internet opens new supply routes, but the wholesalers close
them
Then came the Internet. Its emergence as a national distribution chan-
nel has substantially increased consumer access to rare, unusual, and high-
end wines. Direct shipments from wineries to consumers are estimated at
over $500 million annually, or 3% of the wine market.0 2 The vision of the
Founders had been that some day we would become a single national eco-
nomic unit, with producers in every state having access to the markets in
every other.
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every fanner and every craftsman shall
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation .... Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition of every producing
197 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2(b) (repealed following Granholm).
198 E.g., IOWA CODE § 123.187 (2003).
199 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 178:14 (2003).
200 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4-203.04(J).
201 Brief for WineAmerica et al., supra note 192, at 7, n.6 (citing Bill Nelson & Cary Greene,
Components of a Model Winery Law, VINEYARD AND WINERY MANAGEMENT (Vol. 29, No. 3,
May/June 2003)).
202 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 5.
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area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Foun-
ders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
20 3
The Internet was about to make this vision a reality.
The possibility of a true national Internet wine market threatened the
wine wholesalers' privileged (and lucrative) position as wine's exclusive
distributor. They reacted quickly, by going to the state legislatures with
proposed legislation21 that would ban direct Internet sales. Wholesalers
plied gullible legislators with stories of tax evading scofflaws and anony-
mous bootleggers using the Internet to sell booze to kids with impunity, and
they made large campaign contributions. 205  Most state legislatures passed
prohibition laws easily.
Small wineries were frustrated. Consumers were frustrated. The
wholesalers had demanded and obtained statutory protection against Inter-
net competition, thereby changing the system from one that distributed
wine to one that prevented distribution. The stage was set for Granholm.2°
B. Granholm v. Heald
1. The case
In 2000, thirteen wine consumers challenged Michigan's law prohibit-
ing direct interstate wine sales and shipments. They were fed up with laws
that denied them access to the hundreds of small producers whose wines
were not distributed by the wholesalers, but were readily available on the
Internet. They were joined by a small California winery that did not have a
wholesaler in Michigan and, consequently, was completely excluded from
the market.20 7
203 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
204 E.g., IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2003) (provided that: "It is unlawful for a person in the
business of selling alcoholic beverages in another state or country to ship or cause to be shipped an
alcoholic beverage directly to an Indiana resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler permit under this
title. This includes the ordering and selling of alcoholic beverages over a computer network.").
205 The wine and spirits wholesalers trade associations are the second-largest contributors to state
political campaigns in the U.S. See Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce
Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 361-64 (1999) (wholesalers contribute
substantial amounts of money to state legislative candidates; most state laws prohibiting small wineries
from direct shipping were actually drafted by lobbyists for the wholesalers).
206 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1116); argued together with Swedenburg v.
Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3600 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-
1247).
207 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 468.
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Michigan was among two dozen states that prohibited direct interstate
shipment of wine to consumers.0 8 It was chosen as a test case because its
law was among the most discriminatory and least defensible. At the same
time that Michigan was preventing out-of-state wineries from selling and
shipping directly to consumers, it allowed its own 40 in-state wineries to do
so. 21 Michigan also allowed its 7,500 in-state retailers 21° to ship wine di-
rectly to consumers. The Commerce Clause is at its strongest and the
Twenty-First Amendment its weakest when states discriminate, so this was
the ideal place to attack. Similar lawsuits were filed by consumers and
small wineries in other states with discriminatory regimes-New York,
Texas,212 Florida,2"3 Indiana,214 North Carolina,2 5 and Virginia."6 The Wine
Wholesalers intervened to try to protect their lucrative monopolistic posi-
tion from competition.
The initial skirmishes in district court produced mixed but encouraging
results-five consumer victories and only two losses. On appeal, the con-
sumers prevailed in the 5th and 6th Circuits,2"7 lost in the 2nd and 7th,21 8 and
fought to a draw in the 4th 2"9 and 11 th.22°  The Michigan and New York
cases were consolidated and went to the Supreme Court.
208 See id. at 467.
209 A list of Michigan wineries can be found at http://www.michiganwines.com/Wineries/
wineries.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
210 The number of retail licenses comes from the MICH. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM'N, ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 2003 at 10, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/annual-report
2003_final86520_7.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
211 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
212 Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
213 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11 th Cir. 2002).
214 Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
215 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
216 Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Va. 2002).
217 Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir.
2003).
218 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
219 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding North Carolina's Alcohol Beverage
Control laws unconstitutional for discriminating against out-of-state wine manufacturers and sellers, but
vacating the District Court's ruling of striking down the main provisions of the state's direct-shipment
bans).
220 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11 th Cir. 2002) (reversing the District Court's finding
that the ban on interstate shipments was constitutional, but remanding the case to give the state further
opportunity to prove that the ban advanced an important state interest).
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2. The plaintiffs' argument: discrimination violates the Commerce
Clause
The plaintiffs' argument was simple: this was a case of discrimination.
Michigan allowed its in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers without
going through a wholesaler, and to ship those purchases to residences.
However, it prohibited out-of-state wineries from engaging in these same
commercial activities. Because this scheme discriminated against interstate
commerce and gave economic advantages to local wineries, it was invalid
under the Commerce Clause and could not be saved by the Twenty-First
Amendment. Plaintiffs relied primarily on Bacchus Imports v. Dias,22" ' and
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Healy v. Beer Institute,222 for the
proposition that the dormant Commerce Clause applied with full force to
state laws that discriminated against interstate commerce in wine.223
Plaintiffs advanced three related legal arguments as to why the wine
shipment law met the constitutional definition of discrimination. First,
Michigan gave in-state wineries easier and less costly access to the market.
Out-of-state wineries had to sell their wine through separate wholesalers
and retailers, both of which marked up the price before reselling the wine to
consumers.224 State laws that raise the price of out-of-state goods in relation
to in-state products are "paradigmatic examples" of discrimination against
interstate commerce.225 Second, if an out-of-state winery could not find a
wholesaler willing to distribute its wine-and there are 3,000 who cannot-
it is totally excluded from the market. State laws that cause local goods to
have a larger share of the market are also classic examples of discrimination
against interstate commerce. 26 Third, the law protected the economic inter-
ests of Michigan wholesalers by shielding them from competition.227 Pro-
tectionism is also a classic example of unconstitutional discrimination.228
221 Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1983).
222 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989).
223 See also Vijay Shanker, supra note 205, at 379 (direct shipment prohibitions violate Commerce
Clause).
224 See James Molnar, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws Are a Violation of
the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 169, 186 (2001) (quoting Wall Street Journal as calling
this the most expensive distribution system for any package good).
225 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).
226 Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978).
227 Plaintiffs introduced evidence that the wholesalers were the ones who drafted and proposed the
ban on direct shipments, and engineered its passage. The wholesalers have considerable political clout.
See Vijay Shanker, supra note 205, at 361-64 (wholesalers contribute substantial amounts of money to
state legislative candidates; most state laws prohibiting small wineries from direct shipping were actu-
ally drafted by lobbyists for the wholesalers).
228 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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3. The States' argument
The argument advanced by the states was more complicated. They
conceded that the wine distribution rules treated in-state and out-of-state
wineries differently, to the disadvantage of nonresidents. They conceded
that, if the product were shirts instead of wine, the prohibition against direct
Internet sales would be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they argued that
there was no Commerce Clause violation in this case and, even if there had
been, the Twenty-First Amendment trumped the Commerce Clause and
gave them unlimited power to regulate or ban the importation of alcoholic
beverages.
a. No discriminatory intent
Michigan argued that it did not enact the wine shipment rule with the
intent to engage in economic protectionism, but rather with the intent to
regulate an alcoholic beverage. The different treatment was the accidental
by-product of the state's legitimate decision that everyone needed to be
located in Michigan to be regulated effectively. Michigan's attorneys
pointed to the line in Bacchus that liquor regulations enacted for "mere
economic protectionism" were not entitled to the same deference as those
enacted pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment.229 They argued that
Bacchus did not apply, because Michigan's statutes were not enacted with
the intent to discriminate, but were an attempt to regulate under Twenty-
First Amendment powers.
b. The Twenty-First Amendment trumps the Commerce Clause
Michigan's second argument was that the Twenty-First Amendment
trumped the Commerce Clause under the authority of the Young's Market
line of cases from the 1930s.23 The state characterized the current case law
as inconsistent, pointing to the "broad authority" dicta in several non-
Commerce Clause cases23' for the argument that Young's Market was still
good law. To the extent that Bacchus deviated from this principle, they
argued, it was wrongly decided and should be abandoned.
In the alternative, Michigan argued that, even if the Twenty-First
Amendment does not trump the Commerce Clause in all situations, it does
so in this case, where the laws at issue relate directly to "importation." The
Twenty-First Amendment speaks specifically to importation, singling it out
229 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
230 See discussion supra Part .D. 1.
231 See discussion supra Part ll.D.3.
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as an area of exclusive state regulation. Michigan characterized this as the
"core concern" of the Amendment, arguing that at least laws specifically
advancing this core concern are immune from strict Commerce Clause scru-
tiny. 32
c. The ban is necessary to protect state interests
However, Michigan's primary argument was that discrimination was
justified because it was reasonably necessary to advance legitimate local
purposes-keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors, raising revenue, and
generally protecting public health and safety.
i. Youth Access
Michigan and other states asserted as their primary interest, that the re-
strictive distribution laws were needed to prevent youth access to alcohol.
They argued that underage drinking is a serious problem, that minors have
easy access to credit cards and the Internet, and that the anonymity of elec-
tronic purchasing and common carrier shipping would allow minors to
avoid having to prove their age. Restrictive regulations were needed to
prevent an epidemic of minors receiving wine shipments from out-of-state
wineries over the Internet.
There were four problems with this argument.
First, most states allowed in-state retail wine sellers to take orders by
mail, telephone, and Internet, and ship or deliver them within the state.233
There were over 7,500 wineries and retailers authorized to make home de-
232 This argument was dubious from the beginning. The core concern of the Twenty-First
Amendment is clearly empowering states to enforce local dry laws, not for wet states to regulate impor-
tation procedures. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (core concern of § 2 is
"the promotion of temperance"); Wine Indus. of Mich. v. Miller, 609 F.2d 1167, 1170 (6th Cir. 1980)
(only significant purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment was to permit "dry" states to enforce local
prohibition); Duncan B. Douglass, supra note 109, at 1631-36 (review of legislative history of Twenty-
First Amendment shows that it was meant to refer only to state dry laws); Vijay Shanker, supra note
205, at 375 (1999) (temperance is the core purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment). Nor does the
Court engage in constitutional interpretation by taking a single word out of context. See United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 673 (1998). It is the meaning of the whole of § 2 that matters, and in the overall
context of the Amendment, the power to regulate importation is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
The means chosen to advance a state's legitimate interests are not immune from scrutiny and legitimate
ends "may not be accompanied by discriminating against interstate commerce." City of Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 627. Accord Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340-42 (1992).
233 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1537; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1111(7); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
436.1011 (6)(b).
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liveries in Michigan.2 3 If minors were ordering wine for home delivery, it
would not matter if it came from in-state or out-of-state sources, since mi-
nors are not likely to be seeking only one particular label.235 It was going to
be hard for states to justify the in-state/out-of-state distinction.
Second, the argument lacks evidentiary support. Available data show
that minors consume mostly beer and hard liquor, and relatively little wine.
They rarely buy any kind of alcohol by direct shipments, which take several
days to arrive, because their purchases tend to be spontaneous and made for
immediate consumption. They are far more likely to have someone over
the age of 21 buy it for them or obtain it from a local retail outlet that does
not check identification. Minors also can obtain alcohol easily at parties,
from friends and family, and by stealing it.236 On-line ordering of small
quantities of inexpensive wine-the types of purchases minors would be
likely to make-is also more expensive than local purchases. The FTC
estimates that "[m]inors would have to pay a hefty premium, from 33-83%,
to purchase a bottle of wine costing less that $20 online and have it deliv-
ered to them via 2nd Day Air.
237
Third, the evidence from those states that allow direct shipping did not
confirm Michigan's fears. The experience in those states showed no in-
crease in youth access because of direct shipping of wine.238
Fourth, even assuming a few minors occasionally obtained a few bot-
tles of wine by Internet from out-of-state wineries, Michigan's total ban on
all interstate shipments under all circumstances was overbroad. Michigan
barred shipments that had been purchased face-to-face at a winery tasting
room, after showing an I.D, as well as "anonymous" Internet purchases. It
barred shipments to adults as well as minors. In other situations in which
states want to shield minors from harmful products, such as pornography,
the Court has been reluctant to burden legitimate adult access in order to
prevent occasional youth access. It has generally required that states nar-
rowly tailor their restrictions so that legal adult access is burdened in only
the most limited ways.239 The kind of literature or beverages available to
234 MICH. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM'N, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2003 at 10, available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/annualreport2003_final86520_7.pdf (last visited Aug. 21,
2007).
235 See Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment Of Wine: The Twenty-First Amendment,
The Commerce Clause, And Consumers' Rights, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
236 The studies are summarized in REDUCING UNDERAGE DRINKING: A COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY 166-68, 175-76 (Richard J. Bonnie & Mary Ellen O'Connell eds., 2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089352/html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
237 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 33.
238 Id. at 26-29.
239 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
[VOL. 3:2
E-COMMERCE IN WINE
adults cannot be limited to those that would be suitable for distribution to
children.
ii. Loss of tax revenue
The second interest asserted by the states was tax collection. They ar-
gued that the ban on interstate direct shipments was necessary to ensure that
taxes would be paid. The states believed that their own resident businesses
(local wineries, retailers, and wholesalers) would pay taxes on sales, but
that non-resident businesses would not. The argument was speculative,
because it was being made by states that had not tried to collect taxes from
out-of-state businesses on direct sales. It was also contradicted .by the evi-
dence from states that allowed direct shipping and required that taxes be
paid. The latter reported no problems with tax evasion.2'
iii. Enforcing the Dram Shop Act
Michigan also asserted that the direct shipment ban was necessary to
enforce its dram shop act because it feared that out-of-state sellers would
not be subject to suit. The argument is not really a legal one, since Michi-
gan had long-arm statutes that would technically give its courts jurisdiction
over any out-of-state person who committed an act resulting in a tort in the
state.24' Federal diversity jurisdiction would similarly give injured plaintiffs
access to federal court.242 Rather, the argument was more a worry that, as a
practical matter, it would be more difficult and more expensive to sue and
to collect a judgment from an out-of-state defendant.
iv. Maintaining an orderly market in the interest of public
health
The states made a fourth argument that a ban on direct shipping from
out-of-state wineries was necessary to maintain an orderly and regulated
market because unregulated liquor traffic posed a danger to public health
and safety. They argued that the people who sell potentially dangerous
products need to be identified, investigated, regulated, and held account-
able.
240 See FTC Report, supra note 17, at 38-40 (no reports of significant tax evasion by direct ship-
pers).
241 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705,715.
242 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004).
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The problem with this argument is that the dangers of an unregulated
traffic in liquor justify licensing and regulation, not a total ban on shipping,
and certainly not a ban on interstate shipping only. It cannot be the case
that only out-of-state wine is dangerous if sold directly to the public. The
Supreme Court has consistently rejected the public safety argument as justi-
fication for discriminating against out-of-state businesses--e.g., excluding
other states' harmful waste from landfills,24 3 keeping large out-of-state
trucks off local highways,244 or excluding potentially unwholesome out-of-
state food products.245 Although health and safety considerations are enti-
tled to weigh in dormant Commerce Clause balancing, "if a state discrimi-
nates against out-of-state interests . . . such facial discrimination will be
subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even if it is directed toward a
legitimate health and safety goal."'24 A state may regulate a dangerous
product, of course, but must do so evenhandedly. There is "no valid health
and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste . . . from outside the
State, but not the amount... from inside the State."247 If an out-of-state
shipment deserves to be restricted, so does a similar in-state shipment.
4. Plaintiffs' rebuttal: Reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives
In response to the states' argument that they needed to discriminate
against out-of-state wine shippers in order to advance important state inter-
ests, plaintiffs relied on a series of Commerce Clause cases holding that
discrimination is constitutionally authorized only if there are no reasonable
non-discriminatory alternatives.248 The plaintiffs asserted that each of the
states' interests could be advanced without totally banning interstate wine
shipments.
Youth access can be minimized by adopting procedural safeguards
such as age verification, labeling of boxes as containing alcohol, requiring
adult signatures upon delivery, and conducting stings. The FTC had found
that these methods were an effective alternative to a total ban.249 A delivery
243 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
244 Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 667 (1981); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
245 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 353-54 (1951).
246 GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 307 n.15 (1997) (emphasis added).
247 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 504 U.S. at 367.
248 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1979); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 278 (1988); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992); C & A Carbone, Inc.,
511 U.S. at 393; Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
249 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 26-29.
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driver for a common carrier can be trained to check IDs just as effectively
as a liquor store employee. This alternative is in use in many states.25°
Tax collection can be accomplished by adopting regulations requiring
out-of-state suppliers to obtain permits and to collect and remit taxes. The
FTC Report found that this alternative effectively protected tax revenues in
a less restrictive manner than a direct ban on out-of-state shipments.2 1' New
Hampshire has used this alternative for several years 252 and reports that, not
only has it not lost any tax revenue by allowing direct shipping, it has actu-
ally seen wine tax revenue increase-by $121,635 in 2003-as former ille-
gal shippers begin shipping legally. 53
Dram shop acts and other private forms of accountability can be pro-
tected through long-arm jurisdiction statutes that give local courts jurisdic-
tion over any out-of-state person who causes a tort arising from the illegal
sale of alcohol. 254 Federal diversity jurisdiction would give injured plain-
tiffs access to federal court. 5
Public health and safety can be protected by holding out-of-state win-
eries to the same standards as local wineries. Shippers can be required to
apply for a state license, submit financial documents, submit to a police
background check, have liability insurance, post bonds, submit sales re-
ports, and abide by state laws regulating sales and deliveries. And, states
can police unsafe interstate sales in the same way they police unsafe local
sales-through stings.256
5. The problem of enforcement
The argument over alternatives boiled down to a question of enforce-
ment. Michigan argued that the nondiscriminatory alternative of licensing
and regulation might look reasonable on paper, but would not work in real-
ity because states lacked the ability to hold out-of-state wineries account-
able. They can threaten to put a local winery out of business, but have little
threat to hold over an out-of-state winery. They can make surprise inspec-
tions of local wineries, but not those located across the country. Out-of-
state wineries would ignore state regulations with impunity, knowing there
was little a state could do to punish them for transgressions. The amicus
250 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:27(11) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1001.1(c) (2004);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-16(5) (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-747(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. 2003); VA.
CODE ANN. § 4.1-112.1(C) (Michie 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204(d)(iii-iv) (2003).
251 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 38-39.
252 See N.H. REV. STAT. § 178:14-a(I1).
253 Gary Dennis, Wine Online, MANCHESTER UNION LEADER, Sept. 14, 2004, at F1 (quoting John
Byrne, N.H. Liquor Commissioner).
254 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705,600.715.
255 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004).
256 See FTC Report, supra note 17, at 35-36.
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brief filed by 33 states went so far as to claim that "States have only two
choices: restrict direct shipments by out-of-state wineries or leave this po-
tentially dangerous product virtually unregulated as long as it is shipped
directly to a consumer from out of state." 7 This lack of enforcement abil-
ity justified discrimination, the states argued.
The argument was problematic. When Granholm was being argued,
26 states allowed some form of direct shipping and reported no enforce-
ment, accountability, or compliance problems.258 Most required direct ship-
pers to get a state license in order to sell in the state, which would be re-
voked if the winery misbehaved. 259 This kind of deterrent threat works for
in-state businesses and should work for out-of-state businesses as well. The
cost of noncompliance-loss of a license and thousands of dollars in future
sales--outweighs the immediate benefit of illegally shipping one case of
wine, and it therefore should be sufficient to deter illegal commercial activ-
ity.260
There are also three indirect enforcement routes. First, states can ask
the Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) to proceed against a winery's federal ba-
sic permit. Every winery must hold such a permit,26' which can be revoked
if a winery violates state laws. 62 Furthermore, the TTB has assured the
states that it will act on any complaints. 63 Second, states can use the
Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act that gives jurisdiction to federal
courts to order out-of-state wineries to comply with state laws."6 The Na-
tional Alcohol Beverage Control Association has called this "an effective
tool to use in preventing the illegal interstate flow of alcohol beverages. "265
Third, states can file complaints with the regulatory agency in the shipper's
home state. Shipments to minors may violate the laws of the state in which
the shipment originates as well as the state in which it is received. 66 Many
states also require their own licensees to comply with the laws of other
states,267 and provide for sanctions if such laws are violated.268 Some states
257 Brief of Ohio and 32 Other States as Amici Curiae, at 10.
258 See FTC Report, supra note 17, at 29-31.
259 E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-747 (Law. Co-op. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 53-124(11), 53-160,
53-194.03 (2004).
260 See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance And the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453-54
(2003).
261 27 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
262 26 U.S.C. § 527 1(e) (2006).
263 BATF Ruling 2000-1 (2000).
264 27 U.S.C. § 122a (2004).
265 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 30.
266 See, e.g., CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-104(1); 235
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-29(b); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.12.200.
267 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 104(a), (b) ("No sale of alcoholic liquor shall be made to a per-
son in a state or a division of a state where such sale is prohibited by law."; "No shipment of alcoholic
liquor shall be made into a state or into a division of a state where such shipment is prohibited by law.").
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provide for reciprocal enforcement-if a local winery loses its privileges in
another state, its home-state license may not be renewed.269
The states clinging to their protectionist regimes made no argument
that there was anything unique about their circumstances that would make
enforcement more difficult for them than for other states. They merely
argued that each state was entitled to decide for itself how much risk to
take. However, the argument ran contrary to the Supreme Court's previous
holdings that the practical and economic difficulties in inspecting and hold-
ing accountable out-of-state businesses do not justify discrimination.27°
6. The economic argument
The wine war is about commerce, which is an economic activity. I
know nothing about economics, and cannot tell a monopoly from a cartel or
a rent from a profit. Luckily, an amicus brief was filed in Granholm by
three Nobel laureates in economics and the Chair of the Economics De-
partment at George Mason University.27 The brief summary of the eco-
nomic argument that follows is taken primarily from that brief.
a. E-commerce generally
E-commerce generally has been a boon to consumers and small busi-
nesses. Retail e-commerce sales have been growing at a huge rate and in
the second quarter of 2004 amounted to $15.7 billion. Online retail sales
are growing at ten times the rate of their "brick-and-mortar" counterparts.
As of 2002, e-commerce among businesses had reached roughly $1 trillion
per year. E-commerce is available for virtually all products, whether ex-
pensive, cheap, new, used, plentiful, or rare. Online commerce has brought
consumers wider availability of products and greater price competition.
Consumers now have the ability to do nationwide comparison shopping for
nearly everything they buy. E-commerce has proved essential to many
268 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:27(VIII ("Upon notification by authorities in another state
which imposes a reciprocal enforcement policy, a New Hampshire licensee proved to be making illegal
direct shipments to consumers and licensees in said state shall be subject to action by the liquor com-
mission. Such actions may include fines and suspension and revocation of New Hampshire liquor
licenses.").
269 E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 4-203.04(C); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:359(G).
270 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1950).
271 Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as amici curiae supporting petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
538 U.S. 916 (2003); as amici curiae supporting respondent, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
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small businesses, who have gained access to larger markets without having
to pay fees to middlemen or setting up additional distribution channels.272
b. E-commerce in wine
In its recent report on state barriers to e-commerce in the wine indus-
try, the Federal Trade Commission noted that "state bans on interstate direct
shipping represent the single largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-
commerce in wine. ' 27 3 The Wall Street Journal called the three-tier distri-
bution system for wine the most expensive distribution system for any
package good in the country.274
When the three-tier system was created in 1933, there were few winer-
ies and many distributors, and it worked well. However, the wine industry
has recently seen a remarkably high degree of new market entry by wineries
and an increase in demand by consumers. At the same time, the number of
distributors has fallen due to industry consolidation. The number of whole-
salers has dropped from several thousand in the 1950s to a few hundred
today. In some regions, the distributor market may be approaching near-
monopolistic conditions.275 The limited number of distributors gives them
increased bargaining power, which enables them to select only the most
cost-efficient wines for distribution-primarily those produced in large
quantities by the biggest wineries and wine consortiums. Thirty U.S. wine
companies now supply over 90 percent of the wine sold at retail, and the
top three firms account for 60 percent of volume.276
State regulatory interventions further impede competition at the
wholesale level. Many states have enacted laws that grant wholesalers
preferential contract rights, establish exclusive territorial arrangements be-
tween wholesalers and wineries, and deter price cutting.277 The FTC has
been critical of some of these measures due to their anti-competitive ef-
fects.278
The leading (indeed, the only) empirical study of wine shipment bans
was done in Virginia by Allan E. Wiseman and Jerry Ellig. They found that
272 Brief for American Homeowners' Alliance et al. at 7-9 as amici curiae supporting respondents,
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (quoting various federal government sources).
273 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 3.
274 See James Molnar, supra note 224, at 186 (quoting WALL ST. J.).
275 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 6.
276 Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, Politics, Economics, and the Regulation of Direct
Interstate Shipping in the Wine Industry, CORI WORKING PAPER 03-04 at 7, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=481947 (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
277 DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY 27-28
(2003).
278 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 6-7.
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wine availability was higher online.279 Direct shipping restrictions do not
reduce the aggregate supply of wine-there is more than enough wine
available locally to get everyone as drunk as they wish. Rather, the ship-
ping bans compress the range of choice. Inventory costs and the dis-
economies of scale prevent wholesalers and retailers from offering anything
close to the breadth of choice of wines and vintages actually for sale some-
where. Given the economic necessities, the distribution network generally
limits choices to a small number of well-known brands. This market fails
to serve the needs of consumers of high-end wines, who purchase wine for
future rather than immediate consumption, and who view a broader selec-
tion as important. Direct shipment barriers force upon these consumers
high opportunity costs in the form of lost income or foregone leisure time
associated with travel to distant specialty wine stores or wineries. Opening
those barriers increases competition, which will force current local market
participants to increase selection and supply a greater variety of wines.
Wiseman and Ellig also found some price advantages for online pur-
chases, at least of high-end wine bought by the case.2"0 However, because
of the high cost of transportation, small quantities of low-end wine were
cheaper if purchased locally. If trade barriers were eliminated, general eco-
nomic theory suggests that increased competition should generally reduce
prices.2"' Similarly, economic rents accruing to distributors because of their
monopolistic position will be eroded, further reducing the price to consum-
ers to some degree.2"2 Actual price effects will vary because of transporta-
tion costs. When wine is purchased by a consumer over the Internet and
shipped directly, the transportation costs are the same for a case of "Two-
Buck Chuck '283 and a case of Screaming Eagle.2 4 On the other hand, when
wine is purchased by a wholesaler and shipped through the three-tier sys-
tem, transportation costs vary by the type of wine. Economies of scale
mean that the distribution costs for high-volume low-end wine is less per
case than for small lots of expensive high-end wine. Direct shipping is
therefore more likely to benefit consumers of high-end wine, which is han-
dled in small lots, than for consumers of low-end wine, which is more effi-
ciently handled in large quantities.
No one can predict the consequences of deregulating the wine mar-
ket-after all, many economists predicted consumer gains from airline de-
regulation, but whether or not the effect has actually been beneficial is de-
279 Wiseman & Ellig, supra note 195, at 20-22.
280 Wiseman & Ellig, supra note 195, at 22-28.
281 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 16-17.
282 See id. at 23.
283 Nickname of the popular Charles Shaw brand of wines, which are sold for less than $4.00 per
bottle in Trader Joe's supermarkets.
284 Among the most highly-rated and high-priced wines produced in the United States.
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batable.285 Nevertheless, the economist amici reached three conclusions.
First, the demise of state protection of the three-tiered system will generate
greater diversity of distribution arrangements, greater product availability
for consumers, and expanded market opportunities for wineries. Second, an
expanding market is not a zero-sum game, so increased competition will not
necessarily harm the wholesalers. The current three-tiered system might
flourish if relieved of the expense of handling boutique wines and defend-
ing their turf from Internet competition. The broader availability of "bou-
tique" wines would tend to sharpen consumer awareness and appreciation,
redounding to the benefit of all segments of the wine industry. Third, in a
freer market, "better" wines produced by more efficient wineries would
tend to expand at the expense of "worse" wines whose market position is
currently being propped up by advertising and artificial market control.286
Assuming, arguendo, that the mandatory three-tier system originally
had a legitimate purpose-to reduce consumption and limit the influence of
organized crime--even the best regulatory systems often outlive their use-
fulness and mutate into a means of protecting private rather than public
interests.287 This is clearly the case with the mandatory three-tier system. It
is held in place and defended by special interest groups.288 Riekhof and
Sykuta have found that the economic interests of the wholesalers have
played the most significant role in the enactment of direct shipment bans
against nonresidents, and that the relative size of the native wine industry
was significantly correlated to the adoption of laws allowing in-state direct
shipping. Legislative considerations of the public interest have been con-
spicuously absent.289
The nondiscrimination principle serves as a safeguard against "naked"
interest group transfers that serve no public purpose, but merely transfer
wealth from unorganized constituencies such as consumers to highly organ-
ized interests such as liquor distributors.290 It also protects against interstate
exploitation in which states seek to impose costs on (non-voting) outsiders,
285 E.g., Michael E. Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National
Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965).
286 Brief of George A. Akerlofet al., supra note 271, at 14-15 (citing Dale M. & Philip L. Martin,
Inside the Bottle: The Wine Business, CHOICEs 30, 33 (Fall 2002)).
287 See id. at 17-18 (citing Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974);
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971)).
288 See id. at 18-19 (citing Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory
Economist, REGULATION 12 (May/June 1983)).
289 See id. at 19-20 (citing Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, supra note 271, at 4, 22, 26).
290 See id at 22 (citing Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689 (1984)).
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by regulating on an extra-territorial basis or exempting in-state interests
from burdensome taxes and regulations.29'
7. The Granholm decision
On May 16, 2005, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Gran-
holm v. Heald.292 The Court ruled in favor of consumers and small winer-
ies. It struck down Michigan's total ban on interstate direct shipping as
discriminatory in intent, and it struck down New York's physical-presence
rule293 as discriminatory in effect. The Court applied its traditional Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. The Twenty-First Amendment did not over-
ride or even weaken the Commerce Clause, and did not authorize states to
discriminate against nonresidents and protect local economic interests. The
Court held that all of the states' asserted interests in banning interstate sales
could be advanced through the nondiscriminatory alternative of even-
handed licensing and regulatory laws. States could not constitutionally give
their own wineries preferential access to the market.
Granholm dealt with only one issue in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence: discrimination against interstate commerce.
We hold that the laws in both States discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause, Art. , § 8, cl. 3, and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor
permitted by the Twenty-First Amendment.
294
The Court did not address other closely related issues, such as whether the
mandatory wholesaler requirement is a local processing rule prohibited by
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y,295 or an invalid form of
economic protectionism that violates Philadelphia v. New Jersey.296 Nor
did it comment on other Commerce Clause issues outside the umbrella of
discrimination, such as whether wine distribution laws improperly regulate
291 See id. at 22 (citing Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L.
REV. 563 (1983)).
292 The decision was only 5-4, but the margin is not that slim. Two of the dissenting Justices are
now gone from the Court (Rehnquist and O'Conner), and a third (Stevens, who is 86 years old) may
retire soon as well.
293 In New York, the state argued that all wineries were being treated the same, because any winery
that established a physical presence in the state could sell and ship wine directly to consumers. Brief for
State of N.Y. at 37-40, 2004 WL 2190371.
294 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
295 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
296 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See also Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
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commercial transactions occurring outside the state297 or impose significant
burdens on interstate commerce that exceed local benefits under the Pike v.
Bruce Church balancing test.298
The decision strongly favored consumers, small wineries, and the free
market. The Court held that states cannot disadvantage out-of-state winer-
ies by denying them a reasonable means of access to the consumer market
equivalent to the market access enjoyed by local wineries. It is a violation
of the Commerce Clause "to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to
consumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing
so,''299 or to "to allow local wineries to make direct sales to consumers in
New York on terms not available to out-of-state wineries. '"" The Court
said that the "mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in
one State from access to markets in other States," even if the product is an
alcoholic beverage." 1 It is a violation of the Commerce Clause for a state
"to grant in-state wineries a competitive advantage over wineries located
beyond the State's borders""3 2 or to give "in-state wineries access to the
State's consumers on preferential terms."30 3
The Court was unimpressed by the states' asserted need to ban or
heavily regulate interstate wine sales in order to prevent youth access, col-
lect taxes, and maintain an orderly market. Although these are legitimate
state interests, the Twenty-First Amendment "does not allow States to ban,
or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultane-
ously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. '3 °" Discrimination
against interstate commerce "is neither authorized nor permitted by the
Twenty-First Amendment,"3 3 which "does not allow States to regulate the
direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state pro-
ducers."3 "6 Nor may states prohibit direct sales by out-of-state wineries or
make them "impractical from an economic standpoint."3 7 Nor was any
297 See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
298 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
299 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465-66.
300 Id. at 470.
301 Id. at 472.
302 Id. at 466.
303 ld. at 474.
304 Id. at 493.
305 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466.
306 Id. at 476.
307 Id. at 466. The Court viewed discrimination as a question of economic effect. It described the
Michigan regime as requiring "all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to pass through an in-state
wholesaler and retailer before reaching consumers. These two extra layers of overhead increase the cost
of out-of-state wines to Michigan consumers. The cost differential, and in some cases the inability to
secure a wholesaler for small shipments, can effectively bar small wineries from the Michigan market."
Id. at 474. It described New York's requirement that out-of-state wineries establish a distribution opera-
tion in New York as "additional steps that drive up the cost of their wine.... For most wineries, the
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particular power over interstate commerce found in the Webb-Kenyon
Act.
308
This ruling was solidly connected to the Court's general Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, with no suggestion that the Twenty-First Amendment
changed this in any way.3" Like other laws, a state liquor law that dis-
criminates against interstate commerce will be valid only if the state can
prove, "based on concrete evidence,"3t0 that it advances "a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives."3 ' There is no presumption of validity because the state is
regulating an alcoholic beverage that poses a risk to minors.
Even were we to credit the States' largely unsupported claim that direct shipping of wine in-
creases the risk of underage drinking, this would not justify regulations limiting only out-of-
state direct shipments.
312
There is no presumption of validity because of the state's interest in tax
collection and other legitimate interests.
Increased direct shipping, whether originating in state or out of state, brings with it the poten-
tial for tax evasion.... If licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine
distributed through the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for
direct shipments.... The States have not shown that tax evasion from out-of-state wineries
poses such a unique threat that it justifies their discriminatory regimes .... Michigan and
New York offer a handful of other rationales, such as facilitating orderly market conditions,
protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability. These objectives
can also be achieved through the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement....
[I]mprovements in technology have eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries.
Background checks can be done electronically. Financial records and sales data can be
mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail.
3 13
expense of establishing a brick-and-mortar distribution operation in one State, let alone all fifty, is
prohibitive." Id. at 474-75.
308 Id. at 483. ("The Wilson Act reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace, the
Court's line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor pro-
duced out of state.").
309 See id. at 472. ("Time and again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances,
state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."'); id. at 473 ("Allowing States
to discriminate against out-of-state wine 'invite[s] a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive
of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause."'); id. at 476 ("State laws that discriminate against inter-
state commerce face 'a virtually per se rule of invalidity."'); id. at 475 ( "New York's in-state presence
requirement runs contrary to our admonition that States cannot require an out-of-state firm to become a
resident in order to compete on equal terms.").
310 Granholm, 544 U.S. at493.
311 Id. at489.
312 Id. at 490.
313 Id. at491-92.
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The Court acknowledged that even-handed regulatory systems requir-
ing wine to be distributed through state-run outlets or a privatized three-tier
system were, in theory, legitimate exercises of state authority under the
Twenty-First Amendment.314 However, such a system must work in prac-
tice-giving out-of-state wineries reasonable and realistic access to the
state market. If the state prohibits wineries from distributing their wine
directly to consumers, it must provide an alternative method that actually
distributes the wine, rather than one that prevents distribution."5
Finally, the Court inserted dictum on a matter not briefed or argued:
reciprocity laws that allow direct shipping only from states that grant recip-
rocal direct shipping privileges.
States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored
status for their own citizens.... Rivalries among the States are thus kept to a minimum, and
a proliferation of trade zones is prevented .... The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale
privileges risks generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity,
that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid. State
laws that protect local wineries have led to the enactment of statutes under which some
States condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make direct wine sales to in-state con-
sumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State.... The current patchwork of laws-with
some States banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-of-state wines,
and still others requiring reciprocity-is essentially the product of an ongoing, low-level
trade war. Allowing States to discriminate against out-of-state wine "invite [s] a multiplica-
tion of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.
" 31 6
IV. WHAT NEXT?
A. Does It Matter How States Level The Playing Field?
States have had a variety of legislative reactions to Granholm's com-
mand to create a level economic playing field that does not discriminate
against nonresident wineries. Some have leveled up, extending direct sales
and shipping privileges to out-of-state wineries and opening their markets
to competition from nonresidents. Others have leveled down, extending the
ban on shipping to local wineries and closing the direct sales market to eve-
ryone. Still others have leveled sideways, opening the door to some inter-
state shipments upon terms that appear facially nondiscriminatory, but
which, as a practical matter, will still give preferential market access to
local wineries. Although there are many small variations, the three patterns
are:
First: Anyone may ship wine with a direct shipping permit (leveling
up). Any winery may take Internet orders and ship them by common car-
314 See id. at 465-66, 488-89.
315 See id. at 473-74.
316 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
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rier to consumers if it gets a state permit. The permit generally requires that
the shipper verify age, remit taxes, label boxes as containing alcohol and
requiring an adult signature, and file periodic reports with the state regula-
tory agency.3 7 These laws appear constitutional unless the regulations at-
tached to the permit are so burdensome that they have the practical effect of
excluding many small wineries from the market. For example:
a. Permit cost. In North Carolina, a direct shipper permit is free.318
But in Nebraska, it is $500.319 Where the fee is high, it will ex-
clude from the market small nonresident wineries with only lim-
ited sales in the state. Although the Supreme Court has said that
a state can constitutionally pass on the legitimate costs associated
with licensing and inspections,32 ' the state probably cannot make
the process so burdensome and expensive that it has the practical
effect of excluding nonresident wineries.
b. Case limits. In Minnesota, a winery may ship no more than two
cases of wine per year to any one customer.32" ' In Indiana, a win-
ery may ship no more than 3,000 cases per year to all custom-
ers.322 Such limitations appear arbitrary and have the effect of
limiting the nonresident wineries' market access. The quantity
restrictions give limited, rather than full, access to the market and
preserve most of the wholesalers' monopolistic position as the
only distribution route for most major wine brands. The statutes
therefore seem to violate the rule against "mere economic protec-
tionism" '323 and must be justified as necessary to promote an im-
portant state interest that cannot be advanced by nondiscrimina-
tory means. It is difficult to imagine what legitimate interest the
states will assert in creating case limits.
c. Production limits. Kentucky will issue small winery shipping
permits only to wineries with annual production of 50,000 gallons
or less,324 though all Kentucky wineries produce less than 50,000
317 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:14-a (2006); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.3 (2006).
318 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-902(d) (2006).
319 NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-124 (12) (2006).
320 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951).
321 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.417(a) (2006).
322 IND. CODE § 7.1-3-26-12 (2006).
323 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 296 (1984); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978).
324 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.155(1)(b) (2006).
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gallons per year.325 Maryland will issue winery permits with di-
rect sales privileges only to wineries with an annual production
limit of 27,500 gallons-which happens to be the annual produc-
tion figure of the largest in-state winery that sells direct and does
not use a wholesaler.326 By contrast, Indiana sets permit eligibil-
ity at a whopping 500,000 gallons a year3 7-the annual produc-
tion level of its largest winery. As with case limits, these annual
production limits are protective of local wineries. It is hard to
fathom a legitimate state interest in them.
Second: No one may ship wine (leveling down). Some states have
simply closed the electronic market. No wine may be bought over the
Internet and shipped. If a consumer wants to buy wine, the consumer must
hitch up the wagon, drive to the winery, and purchase it on site.32  Al-
though even-handed on their face, these laws discriminate against nonresi-
dent wineries and exclude them from state markets "in practical effect"
because no one can actually afford to drive 2,700 miles from Maine to Cali-
fornia to pick up a few bottles of Latcham Zinfandel. Some states com-
pound this problem by limiting the quantity of wine that an individual may
personally bring back into the state,329 which rules out even a once-a-year
wine buying trip to stock a wine cellar that might be economically feasible.
The attempt to level down still leaves local wineries with preferential ac-
cess to the market-even if it is not as preferential as it used to be.
One aspect of leveling down deserves special attention. If a state
eliminates the ability of its own wineries to ship wine directly and limits all
wineries alike to face-to-face sales, it gives them a superficially appealing
argument that this is a nondiscriminatory rule designed to assure that all
purchasers must show identification in order to prevent youth access.
However, the argument fails to stand up to scrutiny. The face-to-face re-
quirement as a practical matter excludes distant out-of-state wineries from
the market, but it still meets the Supreme Court's definition of discrimina-
tion. That means the state must prove that there is no reasonable alternative
to closing the market-i.e., that adopting procedural safeguards such as
electronic age verification,33° labeling of boxes as containing alcohol, re-
325 Chris Smigell et al., Kentucky Wine Purchasing and Production Survey, UNIV. OF KENTUCKY
HORTICULTURE DEPT., available at http://www.uky.edu/Ag/NewCrops/winecontentO4.pdf (last visited
Aug. 21, 2007).
326 MD. CODE ANN., art. 2B, § 2-101 (2006).
327 IND. CODE § 7.1-3-12-4.
328 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.155 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 28-A, § 1355(3)
(2006).
329 See IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-15 (2006) (2 case limit per trip); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-2(a) (no
personal transportation at all, except from reciprocal states).
330 See, e.g., http://www.choicepoint.com/business/financiallageveriffs.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2007).
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quiring adult signatures upon delivery, and training drivers in proper age
verification, would not be an effective way to limit youth access.331 The
argument would also run into the problem that the Court requires states, in
exercising their power to limit youth access to harmful materials, to tailor
their restrictions narrowly, so legal adult access is not overly burdened.3"2
Third: Anyone may ship wine that was purchased face-to-face (level-
ing sideways). An emerging trend is to permit direct shipping, but only if
the consumer purchases the wine in a face-to-face transaction on the win-
ery's premises.333 This scheme benefits a few citizens who happen to vaca-
tion in Napa Valley and prefer to ship wine home rather than carry it back
themselves. However, it does nothing for the average consumer who can-
not afford the time and money to drive 2,000 miles to California in the first
place. It also completely fails to address the commerce issue, because it
does not increase access to the local market for out-of-state wineries. Once
local residents have traveled all the way to the out-of-state winery, they
could buy the wine and carry it home even without this new law. Giving
the customer the option to ship it rather than carry it back does not open
market access to any new wine or winery.
B. Reciprocity Laws
Before Granholm, 13 states had reciprocity laws.34 These laws typi-
cally provide that an out-of-state winery may ship directly to consumers
only if the winery is located in a state that affords reciprocal direct-shipping
privileges. The Supreme Court in Granholm said in dictum that these laws
were "generating ... trade rivalries" and creating "an ongoing, low-level
trade war ... destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause. 35
In light of this dictum, reciprocity laws cannot survive. Indeed, California
changed its reciprocal law to a direct-shipping permit law immediately fol-
lowing the Granholm decision.336
331 FTC Report, supra note 17, at 29, 34 (recommending this alternative).
332 E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
333 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.155 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-5-11 (2006).
334 California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
335 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,473 (2005).
336 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23661.3 (2006).
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C. How Far Can Granholm Be Extended?
1. The easy cases
Granholm held that, in the context of laws prohibiting out-of-state
wineries from shipping directly to consumers, the usual Commerce Clause
rules applied. States cannot discriminate by intent or in practical effect
against out-of-state wineries and give local wineries preferential market
access unless there is no nondiscriminatory alternative. The Court rejected
the states' arguments that the ban was necessary to prevent youth access,
preserve tax revenues, assure an orderly market for the protection of public
health and safety, or because of the inability to force nonresidents to com-
ply with state laws. The Court also rejected the argument that the Twenty-
First Amendment gave state liquor laws affecting interstate commerce any
added presumption of validity or that alcohol regulations were exempt in
any way from the rule against discriminatory regulations. The implication
is that the Court will apply the same dormant Commerce Clause principles
to state regulation of liquor that it applies to state regulation of other dan-
gerous products, such as toxic waste. The Court does not say this explic-
itly, so the question is, how far is the Court likely to extend this principle?
The easier issues are those that merely vary the context in which state
laws discriminate. For example, the result should be the same if one simply
varies the kind of license held by the shipper. If a state cannot discriminate
against out-of-state wineries by allowing only in-state wineries to ship di-
rectly, then it is hard to see how it can discriminate against out-of-state
wine retailers by allowing only in-state retailers to ship directly to custom-
ers.337 Similarly, if one merely varies the type of potential customer who
wants to receive the shipment, the result should be the same. If a state can-
not discriminate against out-of-state wineries by allowing only in-state win-
eries to sell directly to consumers, then it is hard to see how it can discrimi-
nate against out-of-state wineries by allowing only in-state retailers to ship
directly to restaurants or wine retailers.338
337 Several lawsuits have been filed raising this issue. E.g., Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Perry, No.
3:06CV0585, 2006 WL 1880524 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2006); Coulombe v. Jolly, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1117
(C.D. Cal. 2006). However, there is one difference between retailers and wineries-retailers do not hold
a federal permit like wineries do, so one avenue of enforcement is not available to the states. See § 1II,
B. 4, supra.
338 Lawsuits have been filed in several states raising this issue. E.g., Baude v. Heath, No.
1:05CV0735, 2005 WL 4889256 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 23, 2005); Beau v. Moore, No. 4:05CV0903, 2005
WL 2807186 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 26.2005).
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2. The intermediate cases
Somewhat less certain is the fate of variants of the New York law
struck down in Granholm. New York's physical presence rule discrimi-
nated as a matter of practical effect339 because it would be prohibitively
expensive for an out-of-state winery to comply with it. If requiring a non-
resident winery to establish a physical presence in order to have access to
the state market constituted "discrimination" because it was so burdensome
that its practical effect was to close the market to nonresidents, then other
kinds of burdens may have the same discriminatory effect. There are two
problems inherent in extending this principle. First, these are fact-sensitive
issues that may depend on proof. Second, there may be many situations
where the practical effect is not all-or-nothing. Several aspects of state
shipping laws fall into this category.
a. Direct shipping permit fee. In North Carolina, a direct-shipper
permit is free3" and burdens no one. In Texas, the fee is $75."4
This, too, seems to burden no one. But a permit to ship to Ne-
braska costs $500.14 If a winery wants to sell directly to con-
sumers and restaurants in Indiana, the permits will cost $700."4
For in-state wineries, the bulk of whose business is sales in Indi-
ana, the expense is justified. But what about out-of-state winer-
ies? Some may do enough business in Indiana to justify the ex-
pense but others, who make only a few sales each year, do not.
Many small wineries will continue to be excluded from the state.
b. On-site purchase rules. In Kentucky, wine may be shipped only
if the purchase was made on site in a face-to-face transaction.3"
It is potentially expensive, both in terms of time and money, for a
consumer to have to travel to a winery to buy wine. Consumers
who live in Louisville will probably be willing to drive the 15
miles to the Huber Winery in Indiana, but probably will not be
willing to travel 1,800 miles to buy wine in Oregon. Again, some
wineries will continue to be excluded as a practical matter from
the local market.
339 The "practical effect" test is part of the Supreme Court's standard definition of discrimination
against interstate commerce. See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654 (1994).
340 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-902(d) (2006).
341 TEx. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 16.02 (1995).
342 NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-124 (11) (1943).
343 The winery will need a $500 farm winery permit, IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-4-4.1-15 (2006), a
$100 direct shipper permit, IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-26-8, and a $100 small wine wholesaler permit,
IND. CODE ANN. 7.1-4-4.1-13(c) (2006).
344 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.155 (2006).
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c. Delivery in own vehicle rules. The flip side of the on-site pur-
chase rule is the rule in some states forbidding the use of common
carriers and limiting sellers to deliveries using their own vehi-
cles. 45 The result is the same. It is just as expensive and incon-
venient for a winery employee to drive to the consumer as for the
consumer to drive to the winery. Huber Winery might send its
truck 15 miles to Louisville to make deliveries, but no Oregon
winery is going to drive 1,800 miles to deliver a case of Pinot
Noir. Laws that require wineries to use their own vehicles and
employees to deliver wine also make direct sales impossible as a
practical matter to most out-of-state wineries, and the state mar-
ket will remain closed to them.
3. The hard cases
The harder issues will involve the validity of state laws that severely
level down and treat in-state and out-of-state wineries equally badly. The
Granholm litigation was about practical discrimination-in-state wineries
could sell wine directly to consumers without going through a wholesaler,
and out-of-state wineries could not. But, what happens if a state cuts off the
in-state wineries' ability to sell directly? Although only Maryland has gone
so far as to forbid its own wineries from selling directly to consumers at
their tasting rooms,346 a number of states have cut off their own wineries'
abilities to sell directly to restaurants and retailers, requiring that everyone
alike use wholesale distribution for this purpose.347 States passed these laws
in anticipation of a future Granholm-like lawsuit charging them with dis-
crimination against out-of-state wineries with respect to direct sales to re-
tailers. By requiring in-state and out-of-state wineries alike to use whole-
salers, discrimination has been eliminated and Granholm does not apply.
However, just because Granholm does not apply does not mean the
Commerce Clause does not apply. It would be a mistake to read Granholm
as saying that state alcohol regulations are immune from Commerce Clause
scrutiny unless they discriminate. To the contrary, Granholm stands for the
proposition that all traditional Commerce Clause principles apply to liquor
just like other products. Therefore, if the Twenty-First Amendment does
not authorize states to violate the Commerce Clause's antidiscrimination
principle, then it also does not authorize states to violate other central prin-
ciples of the Commerce Clause.
345 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.57(2) (2006).
346 MD. ANN. CODE, art. 2B, § 2-204 (2006).
347 E.g., in 2006, Mississippi amended its native winery law to prohibit direct sales by its own
wineries to retail permittees. See 2006 Miss. S. B. 2454, amending Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-5-11 (2006).
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Closing down the direct-sale market and requiring every winery to use
a wholesaler violates several core Commerce Clause principles. First and
foremost, it is an act of economic protection that serves little purpose ex-
cept to line the wholesalers' pockets. Economic protectionism violates the
Commerce Clause.348 Second, it creates a local processing rule that requires
wine that could more efficiently349 be distributed directly from the out-of-
state wineries to be distributed exclusively by in-state wholesalers. Local
processing rules violate the Commerce Clause.35 ° Third, it imposes signifi-
cant burdens on interstate commerce by raising costs and limiting market
access, which exceed local benefits. The Supreme Court in Granholm re-
jected the states' claims that requiring wholesale distribution was necessary
to prevent youth access, collect taxes, and maintain an orderly market. It is
difficult to see any other local benefits to mandatory wholesale distribution
the state could come up with. When the burdens outweigh the local bene-
fits, such laws typically violate the Commerce Clause."'
V. CONCLUSION
At the core of the Granholm litigation is the question of whether the
three-tier distribution system for wine created in 1933 is really "unques-
tionably legitimate?" Despite the dicta in Granholm and other cases that
say so, there is good reason to doubt the efficacy of such boilerplate lan-
guage. The Court has not said the three-tier distribution system is unques-
tionably legitimate for all purposes, including preventing distribution of
out-of-state wines. The evidence is overwhelming that requiring wineries
to distribute through a wholesaler closes the market to most out-of-state
wineries, serves no public interest, and economically benefits only the
wholesalers. It is a classic protectionist, anti-competitive trade barrier to
out-of-state products and a local processing rule. It violates almost every
doctrine of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, frustrates
the intent of the Framers to create a single national economic union, and
survives on the flimsy premise that the Twenty-First Amendment author-
ized states to regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages any way they see
fit.
In Granholm, the Court said once again that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not override the dormant Commerce Clause and did not
give states broad regulatory authority over interstate commerce. States may
348 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
349 Wiseman & Ellig, supra note 195, at 22-28. It is more efficient for the 90% of wineries that are
small and sell wine in small quantities, not for the major producers.
350 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
351 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
2007]
330 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY [VOL. 3:2
not regulate wine distribution any way they see fit for any purpose. As the
history of the Twenty-First Amendment shows, the Amendment was in-
tended to give states power to regulate local production and sale within
their borders, and to prohibit interstate commerce in violation of local dry
laws. One cannot realistically argue that the Twenty-First Amendment
gave wet states the power to erect trade barriers that prevent nonresidents
from selling wine, to give preferential access to the market to local wine
sellers, or to protect the economic interests of in-state wholesalers. That is
what the three-tier system does, and Granholm suggests that its days may
be numbered.
